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Post-quantum readiness for government and critical infrastructure in India

India's national post-quantum roadmap puts government and critical information infrastructure on the fastest track, with full post-quantum adoption recommended by the end of 2029. CERT-In's guidelines already tell government buyers to require a cryptographic bill of materials. This page sets out what the sources say, where the cryptography sits, and what to do first.

8 min readReviewed 8 November 20263 sources

Government departments and critical infrastructure operators run some of India's longest-lived cryptography: citizen records kept for decades, long-validity root certificates, and field devices that outlast their vendor's support. India's national roadmap puts critical information infrastructure (CII) on the earliest post-quantum timeline.

What your regulators expect

Outside financial services, where SEBI's CSCRF already requires post-quantum risk assessment and a cryptographic inventory, no CII sector regulator or line ministry has yet issued a binding, post-quantum-specific direction that we could find in the sources reviewed for this page. The DST task-force report itself recommends sending its findings to ministries such as Railways, Finance and Power, and to regulators such as SEBI, RBI and CERC, "to initiate sector-specific guidance"[1].

InstrumentStatusWhat it says for government and CII
DST / National Quantum Mission, Report on Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India (May 2026)Task-force recommendations; advisory until ministries and regulators adopt themNames government, strategic, defence, power, telecom, transport and BFSI as CII sectors on accelerated timelines: foundations by 2027, high-priority migration by 2028, full PQC adoption by 2029. Recommends common procurement requirements across all government RFPs, with a compulsory bill of materials.
CERT-In, Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, v2.0 (9 July 2025)Technical guidelines; "shall/must" wording, binding force depends on the adopting authority and contract§8.4.1.1: government, public sector and essential services organisations "shall require" a CBOM for cryptographic assets and a QBOM for quantum systems in all related procurements, developments and integrations. §8.5 sets out a quantum-readiness and migration strategy.
CERT-In, Blueprint for Reducing Exposure and Defending against AI-Assisted Vulnerabilities Exploitation in Digital Infrastructure, v1.0 (25 May 2026)Guidance; organisations are "encouraged" to implement itPoints to the v2.0 xBOM guidelines for asset visibility, recommends CBOM and QBOM adoption, and lists IT/OT segregation and air-gapped networks as OT controls.
Figure 1 · Instruments that address cryptography for government and CII in India, as of November 2026. Sources: DST/NQM report pp. 30, 33, 36–37[1]; CERT-In v2.0 §8.4–8.5[2]; CERT-In Blueprint §1, §7[3].

The DST/NQM roadmap: CII dates and procurement

The task force sets three milestones. For CII, Milestone 1 (building the foundations) falls due "no later than 31 December 2027", Milestone 2 (migration of high-priority systems) by 31 December 2028, and Milestone 3 (full migration) by 31 December 2029; other enterprises follow 2028, 2030 and 2033[1]. Milestone 1 includes complete discovery and inventory of cryptographic artefacts, quantum risk analysis, and starting to adopt PQC or hybrid signatures for high-priority software, firmware and systems with a long shelf life[1].

On procurement, the report recommends requesting CBOMs and a quantum resiliency roadmap from vendors from FY 2026–27, and mandating CBOM submission through procurement policy from FY 2027–28[1]. It also recommends that all relevant ministries and regulators establish and maintain a Cryptographic Asset Repository, and that prioritisation extend to "any network handling data with a long shelf life", not only designated critical sectors[1].

Its testing and certification framework places "very high-risk, sovereign, and national critical infrastructure" at assurance level L4 and has a separate level (L2C) for OT hardware such as SCADA and PLCs. It states plainly that the framework "does not constitute a legal or regulatory mandate"[1].

CERT-In v2.0: CBOM in procurement

Beyond §8.4.1.1, suppliers of software, systems or devices involving cryptography "must provide a complete CBOM and/or QBOM" (§8.4.1.2), and organisations must keep an up-to-date CBOM/QBOM for all cryptographic or quantum systems they use, develop or procure (§8.4.1.3)[2]. Section 8.5.1 names RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman and DSA as vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. Section 8.5.4 calls for "tiered vendor Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) contractual requirements": suppliers document their cryptography, report migration progress every quarter with sign-off at C-level, face penalty clauses if they fall short, and prove a quantum-safe alternative works before a contract is renewed[2].

Where the cryptography sits in a government or CII organisation

The table below is typical, not a description of any particular department or operator. It applies across power and energy (control centres, substations, metering), transport (signalling, ticketing, fleet telemetry), government e-services and identity platforms.

SystemCryptography typically in useWhy it matters for quantum migrationSuggested priority
Citizen portals and e-services (web and mobile)TLS with ECDHE key exchange; RSA-2048 or ECDSA P-256 certificates; signed session tokens (RS256/ES256)Personal and financial records cross the internet and can be recorded now for later decryption (harvest now, decrypt later)P0: internet-facing, long-lived personal data, and the key exchange is under your control
Identity and e-sign flowsRSA or ECDSA signatures on authentication responses and signed documents; certificate chains under a national PKI hierarchySigned records must stay verifiable for years; forged signatures later undermine trust in past transactions ("trust now, forge later")P1: high impact, but algorithm changes depend on the PKI hierarchy; inventory and plan now
Inter-departmental APIs and data exchangeMutual TLS with RSA client certificates; signed JWTs; API gateway keysBulk transfers of citizen data between departments are high-value recordingsP1: you often control both ends, which makes it a good hybrid pilot
SCADA/OT remote access and VPNsIPsec/IKEv2 with (EC)DH; SSL VPNs; SSH to jump hosts; RSA device certificatesThe main path into control systems; concentrators and firewalls depend on vendor firmware roadmapsP0: long vendor lead times, so ask for PQC roadmaps in this procurement cycle
PKI and code signingInternal root and issuing CAs (RSA-4096, ECDSA); code- and firmware-signing keys in HSMsRoots issued today can outlive classical security; every update in the estate depends on themP0: the DST roadmap puts PQC/hybrid signatures for long-shelf-life firmware in Milestone 1
Long-lived embedded devices and firmware (RTUs, PLCs, IEDs, meters)RSA/ECDSA firmware verification keys fixed in ROM; TLS or DTLS on constrained chipsField lives of 15 years or more are common; many cannot be upgraded in place and lack compute headroom for PQCP0 for new purchases; P2 for the installed base (contain and compensate)
Data centres and backupsAES for storage; RSA key wrapping in KMS/HSM; TLS or IPsec on replication and DR linksSymmetric encryption holds at AES-256; the public-key wrapping and replication links do notP1: move AES-128 to AES-256 and inventory key-wrapping
Figure 2 · Typical cryptography by system and suggested priority. Priorities are KavachQ's suggestion, informed by the DST/NQM report's guidance on long shelf life, long-lived hardware and AES-256[1].

Air-gapped networks and sovereignty

Isolation lowers harvest-now risk, because an attacker has to be inside the network to record traffic. Signatures are a different matter. Every firmware image, patch and data transfer that crosses the gap is trusted because of a signature, usually RSA or ECDSA. Code-signing keys and their roots are therefore a priority even for networks that never touch the internet. CERT-In's blueprint lists air-gapped environments "supported by data diodes/unidirectional gateways where appropriate" as an OT control[3].

Isolation also constrains tooling: discovery has to run offline and CBOMs have to leave the enclave in a controlled way. CERT-In asks that CBOM/QBOM data be stored and transmitted securely with encryption, access control and integrity mechanisms (§8.4.1.12)[2].

Sovereignty adds a further dimension. The DST report recommends that indigenous PQC implementations be used by critical sectors, while other sectors may use standardised algorithms, and asks that procurement give preference to indigenously developed solutions subject to technical suitability and interoperability[1]. It also notes that the timeline for PQC-based PKI certificates "may be decided by Sectoral regulators"[1]. The practical answer is crypto-agility: systems that can change algorithm, implementation and certificate profile without a redesign, because the final choice may be made by someone else.

CONTAIN WHAT YOU CANNOT MIGRATE

The DST roadmap recognises that some legacy systems will not move in time. It recommends containing classical-only systems "within controlled enclaves where immediate migration is not feasible", and developing gateway devices or quantum-safe middleware to protect them[1].

Where to start

The DST roadmap's advisory CII date for Milestone 1 is 31 December 2027. Five steps for the next two quarters:

  1. Build the inventory, including the enclaves. Cover portals, APIs, PKI, VPNs and OT, and run discovery offline where networks are isolated. Record results as a CBOM in a standard format; CERT-In names SPDX or CycloneDX (§8.4.1.5)[2]. See how to find weak cryptography and the CBOM guide.
  2. Put CBOM and PQC clauses into every new RFP now. The DST report recommends requesting CBOMs from FY 2026–27 and mandating them from FY 2027–28[1]; CERT-In §8.4.1.1 already says government buyers shall require them[2]. Use the PQC procurement requirements, check what comes back with how to validate a CBOM, and see HSM procurement for PQC.
  3. Rank systems by data shelf life and device life. Citizen records, long-term signatures and field devices come first. The Mosca inequality and harvest now, decrypt later explain the reasoning.
  4. Plan the roots of trust. Map every CA and code-signing key (algorithm, validity, HSM) and pilot hybrid or PQC signatures for one high-priority firmware or software release, as Milestone 1 recommends[1].
  5. Check your public endpoints. Run citizen-facing domains through the free public TLS scan, then pilot hybrid post-quantum TLS on one portal or inter-departmental API. Track progress against the India roadmap.

How KavachQ helps

  • Built for closed networks. KavachQ runs as self-hosted Docker in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped, and stores none of your keys. Signed evidence verifies offline against your deployment's published signing-key fingerprint.
  • OT and passive capture. Discover reads cryptography from passive captures, including OT protocols, and from an in-network collector, alongside live TLS and SSH probes.
  • The CERT-In BOM set. CBOM, QBOM, HBOM and AIBOM, each signed, plus CSAF 2.0 VEX and a signed BOM pack.
  • DST/NQM planning. Your DST persona, T1–T4 risk tiers mapped to DST/NQM milestones, and a P0/P1/P2 plan against DST/NQM deadlines.

Frequently asked questions

What is the PQC deadline for critical information infrastructure in India?

The DST/National Quantum Mission task-force report (May 2026) recommends that CII complete foundations by 31 December 2027, migrate high-priority systems by 31 December 2028 and complete migration by 31 December 2029. These are recommendations; ministries and sector regulators are expected to turn them into sector guidance.

Do government departments have to ask vendors for a CBOM?

CERT-In's Technical Guidelines v2.0 (July 2025) say in §8.4.1.1 that government, public sector and essential services organisations shall require a CBOM for cryptographic assets in all related procurements, developments and integrations. The DST report separately recommends requesting CBOMs from FY 2026–27 and mandating them from FY 2027–28.

Which sectors count as CII in India's PQC roadmap?

The DST/NQM report lists government, strategic, defence, power, telecom, transport and banking, financial services and insurance as CII sectors on accelerated timelines. It also says any network handling data with a long shelf life should be prioritised, even outside those sectors.

Do air-gapped OT networks need post-quantum migration?

Yes, though the priorities differ. Recording traffic inside an isolated network is harder, so key-exchange risk is lower, but firmware, patches and data crossing the gap are trusted through RSA or ECDSA signatures. Code-signing keys and their root certificates should be planned early.

Has any Indian power or transport regulator issued PQC rules?

None was among the sources reviewed for this page as of November 2026. The DST report recommends sharing its findings with ministries such as Railways and Power and with regulators including CERC so that they can issue sector-specific guidance.

Sources

  1. Department of Science & Technology, National Quantum Mission, Report on Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India: Roadmap to Quantum Resiliency (May 2026) — dst.gov.in/sites/default/files/Quantum-Safe-Ecosystem-in-India.pdf
  2. CERT-In, Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, Version 2.0 (July 2025) — cert-in.org.in/PDF/TechnicalGuidelines-on-SBOM,QBOM&CBOM,AIBOM_and_HBOM_ver2.0.pdf
  3. CERT-In, Blueprint for Reducing Exposure and Defending against AI-Assisted Vulnerabilities Exploitation in Digital Infrastructure, Version 1.0 (May 2026) — www.cert-in.org.in/PDF/Blueprint_for_Defending_against_AI_Assisted_Exploitation.pdf

Sources checked 8 November 2026. Standards and regulations change; always read the issuing body's current publication. This guide is general information, not legal advice.

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