India BFSI Post-Quantum Readiness Index · 66 institutions · 26 August 2026

42% have started.
3% have finished.

We read the public TLS handshake of 66 Indian banks, insurers, NBFCs, payment rails and regulators — the same handshake your browser performs when it loads their homepage. 28 of them negotiate post-quantum key exchange. Only 2 have closed the classical path that still runs alongside it.

66institutions measured
28negotiate hybrid PQC
24classical only
14indeterminate

What we measured — and what we did not

The index measures the endpoint serving each institution's primary public domain. Nothing else. That is a real limit and it is worth stating plainly: apex domains are often marketing or redirect endpoints rather than the netbanking hosts where customer sessions live. We do not guess transactional hostnames — guessing is how an index stops being evidence.

One TLS handshake per institution, no authentication, nothing probed beyond what the server offers any visiting browser. The cohort is descriptive, not a ranking: we make no claim about which institutions are largest.

Three outcomes, not two. A handshake that fails to complete is recorded as indeterminate, never as a failure to migrate — a middlebox dropping a large post-quantum key share looks identical to a server that does not support one. 14 of 66 landed there, and publishing them as “not quantum-safe” would be false.

By category

Share of each category negotiating hybrid post-quantum key exchange.

hybrid PQC classical indeterminate
Payments & market infrastructure8 of 9
Private banks8 of 20
Public sector banks3 of 11
Insurers4 of 8
NBFCs3 of 7
Small finance banks2 of 7
Regulators0 of 4
The finding

Migrating is not the same as finishing

Hybrid post-quantum key exchange exists only in TLS 1.3. Of the 28 institutions that negotiate it, 26 still accept TLS 1.2 — and any session that lands there falls back to classical key exchange. The post-quantum protection is real, and it is optional.

In this cohort, one public-sector bank and one private-sector bank served TLS 1.3 and nothing else. That is 2 of 66. Every other institution that believes it has migrated still has an open classical path to close.

Check it yourself

Nothing here asks you to trust us. The negotiated group is visible to any TLS client:

openssl s_client -connect hdfcbank.com:443 -servername hdfcbank.com </dev/null \
  | grep "Negotiated TLS1.3 group"

Negotiated TLS1.3 group: X25519MLKEM768

Verified with OpenSSL 3.6.2 on 26 August 2026. Builds without ML-KEM support will not print the group. Every hybrid endpoint in the cohort negotiated X25519MLKEM768; no other post-quantum group appeared anywhere.

Excluded from the count

Where does your institution sit?

This page reports the sector, not its members. We do not publish a ranked list of institutions — but we will send an institution its own measurement, with the handshake evidence behind it.

Request your institution's detail

Or read your own endpoint right now — the scan takes a domain and nothing else.