National security systems: CNSA 2.0
NSA's Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 binds national security systems (NSS) and the vendors that sell into them. Its FAQ (v2.2, October 2026) quotes the binding dates from CNSS Policy 15: CNSA 2.0 required in all new NSS acquisitions by 1 January 2027, non-compliant equipment phased out by 31 December 2030, and CNSA 2.0 mandated for use by 31 December 2031. It adds that from 2027 “no new product for NSS should have a burned-in root of trust relying on a non-QR primitive”, and that the federal deadlines in EO 14412 do not change CNSS Policy 15.
| Function | CNSA 2.0 requirement |
|---|---|
| Key establishment | ML-KEM-1024, for all classification levels |
| Digital signatures | ML-DSA-87, for all classification levels |
| Firmware and software signing | LMS or XMSS (NIST SP 800-208); HSS and XMSSMT not allowed |
| Symmetric and hashing | AES-256; SHA-384 or SHA-512 |
NSA's original 2022 advisory also gave “support and prefer by” / “exclusively use by” years by product type — for example 2025 and 2030 for software and firmware signing, and 2025 and 2033 for web browsers, servers and cloud services — with NSS transition expected to be complete by 2035. The current FAQ no longer carries that table; the dates above are the binding ones.
Federal agencies: EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15
The federal timeline was reset in June 2026. Executive Order 14412 (signed 22 June 2026) requires OMB guidance that moves high-value assets and high-impact systems to PQC key establishment by 31 December 2030 and PQC digital signatures by 31 December 2031. It excludes national security systems, which CNSA 2.0 covers.
OMB M-26-15 (24 June 2026) operationalises it: the objective is “mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by December 31, 2030”; agency migration plans were due within 120 days; the work runs in five phases from inventory and strategy (2026–27) through pilots, key establishment, signatures (2031) and full migration (2035); and plans must align with NIST IR 8547. Agencies are pointed to automated inventory that feeds a cryptographic bill of materials, and EO 14412 tells CISA to publish minimum elements for one.
This builds on earlier steps: OMB M-23-02 (annual prioritised inventories from May 2023 until 2035), EO 14144 (January 2025) and EO 14306 (June 2025), which kept the TLS 1.3 deadline of 2 January 2030 and the CISA product-category list. A July 2024 White House report to Congress put the cost of migrating prioritised non-national-security federal systems between 2025 and 2035 at about $7.1 billion in 2024 dollars.
NIST: the standards everyone inherits
NIST published FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) on 13 August 2024. The final NIST IR 8547 (27 October 2026) deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallows it under NIST standards after 2035, regardless of key size, while noting that this window does not relax the earlier federal deadlines. A standard for FN-DSA (FIPS 206) and one for HQC are still under development. More in our glossary and algorithm explorer.
Contractors and vendors
Section 6(c) of EO 14412 directs the FAR Council to publish, within 180 days, a proposed rule requiring covered contractors to comply with NIST FIPS, including the post-quantum standards, by 31 December 2030. As of 8 November 2026 no proposed rule has been published, and “covered contractors” will be defined in the rulemaking. Meanwhile CISA's product-category list tells buyers that where PQC-capable products are widely available, they “should plan acquisitions to procure only PQC-capable products in that category”, and CNSA 2.0 already reaches the defence industrial base through NSS acquisitions.
Financial services
No US financial regulator has a binding post-quantum requirement. The OCC's June 2026 cybersecurity report says banks “should consider how to effectively monitor developments in quantum computing”; NYDFS's September 2026 industry letter asks that risk assessments consider “advances in quantum computing”; and Treasury's G7 roadmap statement is explicitly “not prescriptive”.
Where KavachQ fits
Every framework on this page starts in the same place: know where your cryptography is, rank it by risk, plan the move, and be able to show the evidence.
- Inventory. KavachQ Discover builds a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM from live TLS and SSH probes, an in-network collector, code, configuration, keystores and certificates, and exports from cloud, HSM and other platforms.
- Risk ranking. A T1–T4 quantum-risk tier for every asset, weighing harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure, and a 0–100 PQC-Ready score for each scan.
- Plan. KavachQ Migrate builds a phased P0 / P1 / P2 plan with a replacement algorithm for each asset. For national security systems, check the plan against CNSA 2.0's parameter sets (ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87); KavachQ's own signatures use ML-DSA-65.
- Evidence. KavachQ Seal signs the CBOM with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), verifiable offline against our published trust anchor.
- Your environment. Self-hosted in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped; your inventory stays inside your boundary.
KavachQ does not certify compliance with any framework on this page — the regulator or buyer decides what it accepts.