RegionAustralia · ASD · ISM

Australia wants RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography gone by 2030

The Australian Signals Directorate recommends ceasing traditional asymmetric cryptography — RSA, Diffie–Hellman, ECDH and ECDSA — by the end of 2030, five years ahead of the 2035 end dates set by NIST and the UK's NCSC. Its Information Security Manual already approves the replacements and asks for cryptographic bills of materials.

—Days
—Hours
—Minutes
—Seconds

To the end of 2026, Canberra time — ASD's date for a refined transition plan.

The timeline

Each date is labelled by what kind of instrument sets it: BindingGuidanceProposalRecommendation

  1. Jul 2022

    ASD guidance first published Guidance

    “Planning for post-quantum cryptography”, most recently updated in September 2025. ASD

  2. Dec 2024

    ISM approves ML-KEM and ML-DSA Guidance

    Controls ISM-1990 to ISM-1996 added; ISM-1917 rewritten to require support for ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024, SHA-384, SHA-512 and AES-256 by 2030. ISM

  3. Sep 2025

    Transition plan control Guidance

    ISM-2073: “A post-quantum cryptography transition plan is developed, implemented and maintained.” ISM

  4. Dec 2025

    Cryptographic bills of materials Guidance

    ISM-2082 and ISM-2083: use a CBOM for imported third-party components where one is available, and produce one for consumers of your software. ISM

  5. Jul 2026

    Questions to ask your vendors Guidance

    ASD publishes a companion guide for buyers. ASD

  6. End 2026

    Refined transition plan Guidance

    “By end of 2026, organisations should have a refined plan for their transition to PQC.” ASD

  7. End 2028

    Transition under way Guidance

    Organisations should have started their transition, beginning with critical systems. ASD

  8. End 2030

    Transition complete Guidance

    Organisations should have completed their PQC transition; RSA, DH, ECDH and ECDSA will not be approved beyond 2030. ASD

ASD's plan

ASD's Planning for post-quantum cryptography is written for “organisations that rely on cryptography to protect systems, services and sensitive data”. It is a recommendation, not a mandate, and it organises the work around a framework called LATICE: Locate, Assess, Triage, Implement, Communicate and Educate. Its end date is unusually early: ASD “recommends ceasing the use of traditional asymmetric cryptography by the end of 2030”.

What the ISM requires

The Information Security Manual turns the guidance into controls. As of the September 2026 release:

ControlWhat it says
ISM-2073“A post-quantum cryptography transition plan is developed, implemented and maintained.”
ISM-1917New cryptographic equipment, applications and libraries support ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024, SHA-384, SHA-512 and AES-256 “by no later than 2030”.
ISM-1991When using ML-DSA, ML-DSA-65 or ML-DSA-87 is used, “preferably ML-DSA-87”.
ISM-1995When using ML-KEM, ML-KEM-768 or ML-KEM-1024 is used, “preferably ML-KEM-1024”.
ISM-1990FIPS 140-3 validation is preferred (amended March 2026).
ISM-2082, ISM-2083Use a cryptographic bill of materials for imported third-party components when one is available, and produce one for consumers of your software.

RSA, DH, ECDH and ECDSA remain approved today, but each “will not be approved beyond 2030”. So will ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65, along with SHA-224, SHA-256, AES-128 and AES-192. LMS, XMSS and SLH-DSA do not appear in the ISM at all, unlike in US and UK guidance. The March 2026 release also added a crypto-agility principle (PRO-17): systems “support timely, prioritised and orderly changes to cryptography, including post-quantum cryptography.”

Hybrid schemes and QKD

The ISM takes the opposite view to most of Europe on hybrids: “The use of post-quantum traditional hybrid schemes is not recommended; however, it is not prohibited”, because there is “no practical value in the use of such schemes in the presence of a CRQC”. Where a hybrid is used, at least one of its algorithms must be ASD-approved. The ISM does not mention QKD at all.

Who is bound

The ISM itself says an organisation “is not required as a matter of law to comply with the ISM” unless legislation or a lawful direction compels it. The Protective Security Policy Framework is that direction for non-corporate Commonwealth entities, which apply ISM controls on a risk basis; check the current PSPF release for its post-quantum requirements. There is no post-quantum mandate for the private sector, and we found no PQC-specific obligation under the SOCI Act for critical infrastructure.

Financial services

APRA's CPS 234 is binding on regulated entities but technology-neutral, and its guidance, CPG 234 (2019), predates the post-quantum standards. We found no APRA or ASIC publication specific to post-quantum cryptography as of November 2026. Absent sector rules, ASD's dates are the most specific Australian reference point available.

Buying technology

ASD's companion guide, Post-quantum questions to ask your vendors (July 2026), is the practical starting point for procurement. Combined with ISM-1917 and the CBOM controls, the message to suppliers is clear: be ready to show your cryptography, and to support ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87.

Where KavachQ fits

Every framework on this page starts in the same place: know where your cryptography is, rank it by risk, plan the move, and be able to show the evidence.

  • Inventory. KavachQ Discover builds a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM from live TLS and SSH probes, an in-network collector, code, configuration, keystores and certificates, and exports from cloud, HSM and other platforms.
  • Risk ranking. A T1–T4 quantum-risk tier for every asset, weighing harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure, and a 0–100 PQC-Ready score for each scan.
  • Plan. KavachQ Migrate builds a phased P0 / P1 / P2 plan with a replacement algorithm for each asset. ASD prefers ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87; KavachQ's own signatures use ML-DSA-65, which the ISM approves until the end of 2030.
  • Evidence. KavachQ Seal signs the CBOM with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), verifiable offline against our published trust anchor.
  • Your environment. Self-hosted in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped; your inventory stays inside your boundary.

KavachQ does not certify compliance with any framework on this page — the regulator or buyer decides what it accepts.

Australia: frequently asked questions

When does Australia want RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography retired?

ASD recommends ceasing the use of traditional asymmetric cryptography — RSA, Diffie–Hellman, ECDH and ECDSA — by the end of 2030. The Information Security Manual says each of these will not be approved beyond 2030.

Which post-quantum algorithms does ASD approve?

The ISM approves ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 for key establishment and ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 for signatures, preferring ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87. ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 will not be approved beyond 2030. LMS, XMSS and SLH-DSA are not in the ISM.

Is the ISM mandatory?

Not by itself. The ISM says organisations are not legally required to comply unless legislation or a lawful direction compels them. Non-corporate Commonwealth entities apply ISM controls through the Protective Security Policy Framework. There is no post-quantum mandate for the private sector.

Does ASD allow hybrid post-quantum schemes?

Hybrid schemes are not recommended but are not prohibited. If one is used, at least one of its algorithms must be ASD-approved.

Does APRA require post-quantum cryptography?

No. APRA's CPS 234 is technology-neutral and has no post-quantum requirement, and we found no APRA or ASIC publication specific to post-quantum cryptography as of November 2026.

Sources

Primary sources, checked on 8 November 2026. Read them alongside this summary and your own compliance team.

  1. ASD — Planning for post-quantum cryptography
  2. ASD — Planning for PQC (September 2025, PDF)
  3. ASD — Information Security Manual
  4. ASD — ISM September 2026 release (OSCAL)
  5. ASD — Post-quantum questions to ask your vendors
  6. Protective Security Policy Framework — applying the PSPF
  7. APRA — CPG 234 Information Security (2019)

Other regions

Start with the inventory

Every timeline here starts with knowing your cryptography

Scan a public domain free in seconds, then scope a pilot that inventories a real slice of your estate.