What the NCSC asks for
The National Cyber Security Centre published its timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography on 20 March 2025. They are “indicative timelines that UK industry, government and regulators can follow”: the core dates apply to all organisations, but the guidance is aimed mainly at large organisations, operators of critical national infrastructure (including industrial control systems), and companies with bespoke IT.
The first milestone is the one most organisations underestimate. By 2028 the NCSC expects a full discovery exercise — knowing where quantum-vulnerable cryptography is used — and an initial migration plan. Migration itself starts in earnest after that, with the highest-priority systems done by 2031 and everything else by 2035.
Which algorithms the NCSC recommends
| Use | Recommended | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Key establishment | ML-KEM (FIPS 203) | ML-KEM-768 “for most use cases” |
| Digital signatures | ML-DSA (FIPS 204) | ML-DSA-65 “for most use cases” |
| Firmware and software signing | SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), LMS, XMSS | LMS and XMSS only where signing state can be managed “in a trusted manner for the lifetime of the signing key” |
| TLS | TLS 1.3 with hybrid groups X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 or SecP384r1MLKEM1024 | TLS 1.3 “is the only version that will receive new features in future, such as support for PQC” (TLS guidance v1.2, 15 October 2026) |
The NCSC says all the ML-KEM and ML-DSA parameter sets give “an acceptable level of security for personal, enterprise and OFFICIAL-tier government information”. Source: Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography (November 2023, updated August 2024).
Hybrid schemes and QKD
The NCSC treats hybrid post-quantum/traditional schemes as a stepping stone: if one is chosen, “it is used as an interim measure”, within a framework that makes moving to PQC-only straightforward later. For PKI, a single migration to a post-quantum PKI is preferred over an intermediate hybrid PKI.
On quantum key distribution it is blunt: “The NCSC will not support the use of QKD for government or military applications”, QKD “does not provide authentication”, and in other sectors it “should not be solely relied upon” (Quantum networking technologies, 5 August 2025).
Financial services
On 4 November 2026 the FCA wrote that, “in line with NCSC guidance, we expect firms to act now” — mapping their cryptography, setting migration objectives and carrying out migration plans. It is trialling a supervisory self-assessment tool with a first sample of firms and will consult on cyber-resilience guidance that sets out how firms should address post-quantum risk (FCA). That is a supervisory expectation, not a rule, and no consultation date has been given.
The Bank of England's October 2025 report warned that quantum computing “could render obsolete the asymmetric cryptography algorithms underpinning the entire financial system” and said it is piloting a supervisory briefing on quantum risk. In January 2026 HM Treasury published the G7 Cyber Expert Group's statement on a coordinated financial-sector roadmap, which suggests addressing the most critical systems in 2030–32 — while stating that it “does not set guidance or regulatory expectations”. We have not found a PRA requirement specific to post-quantum cryptography.
Government, legislation and support
The Government Cyber Action Plan (6 January 2026, updated 20 March 2026) commits to a government-wide approach and a roadmap for PQC migration, without a hard deadline. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill was still before Parliament in early November 2026; we have not seen post-quantum provisions in it.
For help with the work itself, the NCSC runs a post-quantum pilot inside its Assured Cyber Security Consultancy scheme, covering discovery and migration planning, expected to run until 31 March 2027.
Where KavachQ fits
Every framework on this page starts in the same place: know where your cryptography is, rank it by risk, plan the move, and be able to show the evidence.
- Inventory. KavachQ Discover builds a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM from live TLS and SSH probes, an in-network collector, code, configuration, keystores and certificates, and exports from cloud, HSM and other platforms.
- Risk ranking. A T1–T4 quantum-risk tier for every asset, weighing harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure, and a 0–100 PQC-Ready score for each scan.
- Plan. KavachQ Migrate builds a phased P0 / P1 / P2 plan with a replacement algorithm for each asset. The NCSC's defaults are ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65.
- Evidence. KavachQ Seal signs the CBOM with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), verifiable offline against our published trust anchor.
- Your environment. Self-hosted in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped; your inventory stays inside your boundary.
KavachQ does not certify compliance with any framework on this page — the regulator or buyer decides what it accepts.