GuideHBOMCERT-In v2.0 · §10

What is an HBOM?

CERT-In's Technical Guidelines v2.0 (July 2025) added the HBOM to the set. Here is what section 10 asks for, row by row, the extra fields government buyers need, and a schema-valid sample you can download.

The definition, in CERT-In's words

Section 10.1 defines an HBOM as “a structured inventory of all physical components, sub-components, embedded devices, and associated materials that constitute a hardware system or product.” It names what that covers — servers, networking equipment, storage devices, end-user systems, power backup and security infrastructure — and why it matters: traceability, integrity, and compliance with security and procurement standards.

The benefits it lists (§10.2) run from supply-chain risk — knowing the origin and authenticity of each part, and catching counterfeit or unapproved ones — to spotting malicious implants or unauthorised modifications, managing assets to end of life, faster replacement during outages, and, used with an SBOM, visibility across both hardware and software, including firmware.

Parts within parts

Table 11's last row is what makes an HBOM different: Sub-component. If a component contains further distinct hardware parts, those are listed too, with similar detailed attributes. A router contains a mainboard; the mainboard carries a processor and a security chip; each can come from a different supplier in a different country. Select a part:

An HBOM's recursive structure: a branch router, its mainboard and firmware, and the mainboard's processor and security chip PRODUCT SUB-COMPONENT ITS SUB-COMPONENT Branch router BR-200Rev C · Bengaluru, IN Mainboardv3.1 · Chennai, IN Firmware4.7.2 · licensed Network SoC16 nm · Hsinchu, TW TPM 2.0 modulerev A2 · Munich, DE

Router → mainboard and firmware → processor and security chip.

Figure 1 · Table 11's recursive Sub-component row, for an illustrative branch router. Every company, product and value is fictional. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, Table 11, pp. 60–61.

The 20 rows of Table 11

Pick a row to see what CERT-In asks for, the value for the same router, and where it sits in a CycloneDX document. Two pairs of rows share a name: Supplier Information and Supplier Location appear first for whoever sold the product, then again for the direct supplier of each component. CycloneDX has device and firmware components but few hardware-specific fields, so many rows are carried as named properties. The sample on the right is a real, schema-valid CycloneDX 1.6 file.

Turn on JavaScript to explore the rows, or read the full list in Table 11 of the guidelines.


        
hbom-example.cdx.json · CycloneDX 1.6 · validated against the official schemaDownload the sample
Figure 2 · Table 11 rows with the illustrative router (fictional companies and values, for teaching only). Rows without a native CycloneDX field are carried as named properties. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, Table 11, pp. 60–61.

What government buyers add: §10.4.1.4

For hardware supplied to government and public-sector entities, §10.4.1.4 says the HBOM must include data fields such as manufacturer name, model number, component version, firmware version, origin, criticality rating and associated vulnerabilities. Set beside Table 11, four of those seven have no row of their own:

Already rows of Table 11

  • Manufacturer name
  • Model number
  • Component version — Table 11 has Product Version

Added by §10.4.1.4

  • Firmware version
  • Origin — Table 11 records the manufacturer's and suppliers' locations
  • Criticality rating
  • Associated vulnerabilities
Figure 3 · The seven fields §10.4.1.4 names, against Table 11. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, §10.4.1.4, p. 62, and Table 11, pp. 60–61.

In the sample, the firmware's version sits on its own firmware component, criticality is a named property, and vulnerabilities use CycloneDX's vulnerabilities array. For a vulnerability, §10.4.1.5 asks hardware vendors and integrators for a VEX or an equivalent hardware vulnerability statement — Not Affected, Affected, Fixed or Under Investigation — followed by a CSAF advisory with the technical detail, severity, mitigations and impact.

What §10.4 asks organisations to do

CERT-In's HBOM recommendations, in brief. Read the clause text in the guidelines for the exact wording.

  1. §10.4.1.1Government, public-sector and essential-services organisations, and organisations that manufacture, deploy or integrate hardware, should mandate HBOM requirements in all hardware procurement and supply contracts.
  2. §10.4.1.2All hardware supplied to government, public-sector and essential-services organisations must come with a complete and accurate HBOM covering all critical components and sub-components.
  3. §10.4.1.3Those organisations must maintain HBOMs for all hardware in use, procured or built in-house.
  4. §10.4.1.4HBOMs for government and public-sector hardware must include fields such as manufacturer name, model number, component version, firmware version, origin, criticality rating and associated vulnerabilities.
  5. §10.4.1.5When a component vulnerability is found, vendors and integrators must provide a VEX or equivalent hardware vulnerability statement; a CSAF advisory should follow.
  6. §10.4.1.6Use structured, machine-readable formats — preferably extended SBOM formats like CycloneDX, or custom XML/JSON schemas.
  7. §10.4.1.7Integrate HBOM data with hardware vulnerability databases, CERT-In vulnerability notes, firmware advisories and threat intelligence.
  8. §10.4.1.8Consumers update their internal HBOMs for any patching, component replacement or firmware update.
  9. §10.4.1.9A separate HBOM for each hardware version or model, updated only with new component information or corrections.
  10. §10.4.1.10Consumers build an internal HBOM from the supplier's, enriched with asset-specific details.
  11. §10.4.1.11Security teams bring the HBOM into asset-management and vulnerability-management workflows.
  12. §10.4.1.12Audit periodically for HBOM accuracy, completeness and traceability across the hardware lifecycle.
  13. §10.4.1.13Correlate HBOM data with vulnerability intelligence — VEX, CSAF or firmware CVEs — to prioritise hardware risk.
  14. §10.4.1.14Store and transmit HBOM data securely — encryption, access controls and data-integrity mechanisms against tampering.
  15. §10.4.1.15Update HBOMs routinely as components are added, replaced or modified.

The best practices in §10.4.2: include metadata for each component, so a compromised firmware version can be traced and manufacturing origins assessed; keep version control and change logs for forensics and audits; protect HBOMs, which hold sensitive design information, with confidentiality and access control; audit and validate to find hidden or undeclared components; automate HBOM generation so it matches actual production builds; and track provenance to keep out counterfeit parts and score supplier risk.

CERT-In's guidelines use “should” and “must”, but they are technical guidelines; how they bind you depends on your regulator and your contracts.

WHERE HARDWARE MEETS QUANTUM RISK

Hardware is where cryptography is hardest to change: in firmware, secure-boot chains, security chips and HSMs, an algorithm can be fixed for the life of the device. An HBOM that records firmware versions and security components is the starting point for knowing which devices will need replacing, not just patching, before quantum-vulnerable algorithms are retired.

How KavachQ produces an HBOM

KavachQ generates the HBOM as its own CycloneDX document, against Table 11 plus the four §10.4.1.4 fields Table 11 lacks:

  • Declared entries come from your hardware registry, and from the hardware in your quantum-device registry — QKD links, quantum random number generators, post-quantum HSMs and appliances, cross-referenced with the QBOM. No network scan can see inside a box, so KavachQ carries your statement and labels it as declared.
  • A TLS endpoint is never turned into a hardware entry: a handshake says nothing about the box behind it.
  • Sub-components are linked to their parent, so the HBOM keeps Table 11's recursive structure, and firmware is linked to the cryptography it carries in the CBOM.
  • Every Table 11 and §10.4.1.4 element is present on every component, either as a value or explicitly marked unknown, not applicable or withheld — never silently missing.
  • Table 11 has no signature row, but §10.4.1.14 asks for integrity mechanisms: the signed variant carries an ML-DSA (FIPS 204) signature, verifiable offline against KavachQ's published trust anchor.

HBOM: frequently asked questions

What is an HBOM?

In CERT-In's Technical Guidelines v2.0 (9 July 2025), a Hardware Bill of Materials (HBOM) is a structured inventory of all the physical components, sub-components, embedded devices and associated materials that make up a hardware system or product — servers, networking equipment, storage devices, end-user systems, power backup and security infrastructure. Table 11 sets 20 minimum elements.

What are the minimum elements of an HBOM?

Table 11 has 20 rows: product name, version and details; warranty or AMC; manufacturer name, location and manufacturing date; supplier information and location; model number; serial number; technical specification; the component supplier's information and location; technology node; compliance; power supply; license information; test result; and sub-components, which makes the HBOM recursive.

Why does supplier information appear twice in Table 11?

The first pair of rows records the company that provided or sold the product and its address. The second pair records the company that supplied each component to the manufacturer of the larger product, and its city and country.

What extra fields does an HBOM for government need?

Section 10.4.1.4 says an HBOM accompanying hardware supplied to government and public-sector entities must include data fields such as manufacturer name, model number, component version, firmware version, origin, criticality rating and associated vulnerabilities. Firmware version, origin, criticality rating and associated vulnerabilities have no row of their own in Table 11.

What format should an HBOM use?

Section 10.4.1.6 recommends structured, machine-readable standards, preferably extended SBOM formats like CycloneDX or custom XML or JSON schemas based on organisational needs.

Does an HBOM have to be signed?

Table 11 has no signature element. Section 10.4.1.14 says HBOM data must be stored and transmitted securely, using encryption, access controls and data integrity mechanisms to prevent tampering or unauthorised access.

HBOM, signed

Ship hardware with a signed HBOM

Scope a pilot that produces a signed HBOM, CBOM and QBOM for one product — ready for a tender.