Three patterns · 35 reference sites
Which one is your website?
We scanned the public websites of major banks, governments, technology and payments companies across eight regions. Every one of them fell into one of three patterns.
19of 35 did not negotiate post-quantum key exchange with our probe
10of 35 refuse TLS 1.3, so post-quantum cannot even be switched on
35of 35 still sign with a classical certificate. No public CA issues a post-quantum one yet
Pattern A16 of 35 sites
Post-quantum at the front door
70–82score range
- Browser hopSealed on TLS 1.3
- Behind itNot visible
- CertificateRSA / ECDSA
Browsers negotiate hybrid ML-KEM, usually at a CDN edge, so traffic recorded on that hop stays sealed. The certificate is still classical, and the connection behind the edge is a second session no outside scan sees.
Way outProve the hop behind the edge, refuse TLS 1.2, and plan the certificate move.
Pattern B9 of 35 sites
Modern TLS, classical keys
0–24score range
- Browser hopRecordable today
- Behind itNot visible
- CertificateRSA / ECDSA
TLS 1.3 is on, but the key exchange is X25519 or another elliptic curve on its own. Every session can be recorded now and decrypted once a large quantum computer exists. Nobody has to break in; they only have to keep a copy.
Way outOften a configuration change: enable hybrid X25519MLKEM768 wherever TLS terminates.
Pattern C10 of 35 sites
Stuck before TLS 1.3
0–12score range
- Browser hopNo TLS 1.3
- Behind itNot visible
- CertificateRSA / ECDSA
The server refuses TLS 1.3 outright, and post-quantum key exchange exists only in TLS 1.3. There is no setting to switch on. Until the protocol is upgraded, every session stays classical and can be recorded today.
Way outUpgrade whatever terminates TLS — load balancer, firewall or appliance — and test client compatibility. Hybrid key exchange comes after.