Most of the cryptography in a bank or ministry was bought, not written. It sits in core banking platforms, HSMs (hardware security modules), load balancers and SaaS contracts. If those suppliers do not move to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), you cannot either. Procurement is where you set that expectation, and Indian and US guidance now say so explicitly.
What the guidance actually says
CERT-In v2.0, §8.4 and §8.5
CERT-In's Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM (v2.0, 9 July 2025) contain the clearest Indian procurement language[1]:
- §8.4.1.1: government, public sector and essential services organisations "shall require" a CBOM for cryptographic assets and a QBOM for quantum systems "in all related procurements, developments, and integrations".
- §8.4.1.2: suppliers of software, systems or devices involving cryptographic or quantum technologies "must provide a complete CBOM and/or QBOM".
- §8.4.1.5: BOMs shall use recognised formats "such as" SPDX or CycloneDX.
- §8.4.1.6: when vulnerabilities are found in cryptographic or quantum components, developers and integrators must issue a VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) document with one of four statuses: Not Affected, Affected, Fixed or Under Investigation.
- §8.4.2.8: review the CBOM/QBOM "at least quarterly".
- §8.5.4: "Implement tiered vendor Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) contractual requirements. Service providers must document all cryptographic implementations (e.g., RSA data encryption, ECC certificate management), provide quarterly migration progress reports with C-level executive attestation, establish penalty clauses for non-compliance, and demonstrate quantum-safe alternatives through proof-of-concepts prior to contract renewals".
The wording is "shall" and "must", but this is technical guidance. How it binds your organisation depends on your regulator and on what your contracts actually say. Note too that in CERT-In's model the QBOM covers quantum devices and quantum-safe components, while the list of quantum-vulnerable RSA and ECC usage is the CBOM. See CERT-In xBOM guidelines and QBOM.
India's DST task-force report (May 2026)
The DST task force's final report, Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India (May 2026, which follows a February 2026 draft), recommends, among its short-term actions, "common procurement requirements across all government RFPs" to ensure crypto-agile, PQC-compliant assets with a compulsory bill of materials (§9.0)[2]. Its enterprise roadmap (Annexure C) is more specific. From FY 2026–27, start requesting CBOMs and a quantum resiliency roadmap from vendors through procurement policy or service agreements. From FY 2027–28, mandate CBOM submission. By Milestone 2 (CII 31 December 2028, other enterprises no later than 31 December 2030), "Include mandatory PQC/Hybrid cryptography and crypto-agility clauses in all contracts"[2]. Its sub-group test guidance asks vendors to switch between hybrid implementations through a CLI, GUI or API, and to provide a crypto-switching roadmap (Annexure B, Annexure-I item 6.3)[2]. These are recommendations to government and enterprises, not a statute. See the India roadmap.
US: CISA product categories
On 23 January 2026, CISA published a list of product categories under Executive Order 14306, in two tiers. Where PQC-capable products are widely available (cloud PaaS and IaaS, chat and messaging, web browsers and servers, full-disk encryption), "organizations should plan acquisitions to procure only PQC-capable products from that category". A second tier lists categories still transitioning, including networking hardware, PKI management software and HSMs[3]. CISA notes that most widely available categories have PQC for key establishment but not yet for signatures, so they are not considered fully quantum-resistant. India's task force recommends a national list modelled on CISA's[2]. See US region.
Bank tenders in India
Indian banks are already writing this into RFPs. SBI's October 2026 software RFP for a project and portfolio management tool (ref. 1506, dated 12 October 2026) requires an SBOM (Annexure R) and, wherever applicable to the solution, a QBOM, CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM (Annexures S–V). The BOM must be kept current and resubmitted at onboarding, on any material change, and when the bank or a regulator asks. It also asks for a VEX and a CSAF advisory after a vulnerability is found[4]. Separately, some bank tenders ask for a 13-column self-declaration on letterhead. That format comes from bank tenders, not from CERT-In's guidelines. See the 13-column self-declaration and Declare.
Requirements to write into contracts
| Requirement | Why | Evidence to ask for | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Machine-readable CBOM for the delivered solution | You cannot plan migration for cryptography you cannot see | CycloneDX or SPDX file, version-matched to the release delivered | CERT-In §8.4.1.2, §8.4.1.5[1]; DST Annexure C[2] |
| CBOM kept current | Point-in-time BOMs go stale with each patch | Resubmission on every release and material change; quarterly review | CERT-In §8.4.1.13, §8.4.2.8[1]; SBI RFP[4] |
| VEX on cryptographic vulnerabilities | Tells you whether a CVE affects your build | VEX with Not Affected / Affected / Fixed / Under Investigation | CERT-In §8.4.1.6[1] |
| PQC migration roadmap with dates | Your deadlines depend on theirs | Dated roadmap per product for ML-KEM key establishment and ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signatures | DST Annexure C[2]; NIST IR 8547[5] |
| Quarterly progress reporting | Roadmaps slip quietly | Quarterly report with executive attestation | CERT-In §8.5.4[1] |
| Hybrid PQC support | Lets you add ML-KEM without dropping classical interoperability | Supported TLS groups, e.g. X25519MLKEM768 | RFC 10024[6]; DST Annexure C[2] |
| Crypto-agility | Algorithm changes should be configuration, not a rebuild | Demonstrated switch via CLI, GUI or API; rollback | DST Annexure B, item 6.3[2] |
| Proof of concept before renewal | Claims are cheap; a working PoC is evidence | PoC report on your test environment | CERT-In §8.5.4[1] |
| Validated cryptographic modules | FIPS 140-2 certificates moved to the Historical List on 22 September 2026 | FIPS 140-3 certificate number and the algorithms it covers | NIST CMVP[7] |
| Penalties for non-compliance | Without consequences, obligations become optional | Named remedies in the contract | CERT-In §8.5.4[1] |
Sample clause wording
The wording below is a plain-language starting point, not legal advice. Adapt it to your contract form, regulator and jurisdiction.
- CBOM. "The Supplier will deliver a cryptographic bill of materials in CycloneDX or SPDX format for each release supplied, covering algorithms, keys, protocols and certificates. The Supplier will deliver an updated CBOM within [30] days of any release or material change."
- Roadmap. "Within [90] days of signing, the Supplier will provide a dated roadmap for post-quantum key establishment and post-quantum signatures in the product. The Supplier will report progress against it every quarter, signed by a named senior executive."
- Agility. "The Supplier will make cryptographic algorithms and parameters selectable through configuration, and will demonstrate switching and rollback on the Customer's test environment on request."
- Vulnerabilities. "Within [X] days of a vulnerability affecting a cryptographic component becoming public, the Supplier will issue a VEX statement giving one of these statuses: not affected, affected, fixed or under investigation."
- Renewal. "Before renewal, the Supplier will demonstrate its post-quantum capability through a proof of concept agreed with the Customer."
A ten-question vendor questionnaire
- Can you supply a CBOM for the exact version we will run, in CycloneDX (state the spec version)?
- Is your CBOM signed, and how can we verify the signature and who produced it?
- What is your dated roadmap for ML-KEM key establishment and for ML-DSA or SLH-DSA signatures, product by product?
- Do you support hybrid key exchange today (for example X25519MLKEM768 in TLS 1.3)? On which interfaces?
- Can we change algorithms and key sizes through configuration, without a code change or a new release? Show us.
- Which cryptographic modules do you use, and what is their FIPS 140-3 certificate status?
- For HSMs: which firmware version adds PQC algorithms, is that firmware validated, and can existing units be upgraded in place?
- Will you issue VEX statements for vulnerabilities in cryptographic components, and how quickly?
- How often do you ship cryptographic updates, and what is your support lifecycle for each major version?
- Which of your third-party components (libraries, cloud services) constrain your PQC timeline?
Push hardest on questions 3, 5 and 7. They are where vendor answers are most often vague, and where your own migration dates depend on theirs. For HSM-specific buying, see HSM procurement for PQC.
How KavachQ helps
KavachQ helps on both sides of the table:
- Buyers can track which suppliers block their migration and keep a signed vendor scorecard for each.
- Vendors can use KavachQ Declare to assemble SBI's Annexures R–V and the 13-column self-declaration from their own code, builds and declarations, with a CI gate that emits SARIF 2.1.0.