At a glance
| Published | 09 July 2025 (v1.0 was October 2024) |
| Issued by | CERT-In, under MeitY |
| Scope | Five bill-of-materials types: SBOM, CBOM, QBOM, AIBOM, HBOM |
| Status | Advisory — but referenced by sectoral regulators and copied into tenders |
| Recommended for | Public sector, government, essential services, software exporters |
| Formats | Machine-readable: CycloneDX or SPDX |
Guidance becomes binding the moment a procurement officer pastes it into an annexure. At least one public-sector bank tender on GeM (Punjab & Sind Bank, 2026) requires SBOM and CBOM as contractual deliverables — with quarterly refresh obligations and material-breach language. For a vendor bidding into those, the guidelines are not advisory; they are the contract.
§3 and Table 5 — the SBOM minimum elements
Table 5 lists the fields every SBOM must carry, per component. A compliant SBOM is generated, not maintained by hand, and is complete down to transitive dependencies.
| Element | What it means in practice |
|---|---|
| Component name | Every component, not just direct ones |
| Version | Exact version, not a range |
| Unique identifier | PURL or CPE, so the row is machine-resolvable |
| Supplier / author | Who ships it — the provenance anchor |
| Dependency relationships | Top-level and transitive; this is where hand-made SBOMs fail |
| License | Per component, including open-source terms |
| Cryptographic hash | Makes the entry verifiable rather than assertable |
| Timestamp | Point-in-time — an SBOM is a photograph, not a portrait |
| Known unknowns | Explicitly flag where completeness could not be established |
The last element is the one most tools skip, and it is the most important for an auditor. A bill of materials that silently omits what it could not see is worse than one that says so.
§3.2 — the six SDLC SBOM classes
The guidelines tie SBOM generation to the software lifecycle. Each class answers a different assurance question, and most teams have all their coverage at the front of the list.
| Class | Answers |
|---|---|
| Design | What we intend to build with |
| Source | What the repository declares |
| Build | What the pipeline actually assembled |
| Analyzed | What analysis of the build output found |
| Deployed | What was shipped to the environment |
| Runtime | What is actually loaded and executing |
§6 — VEX and CSAF, not raw scan dumps
Vulnerability state must be communicated through VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) statements — affected, not affected, fixed, under investigation — and machine-readable CSAF advisories. The intent is to end the practice of forwarding a 12,000-line scanner export and calling it disclosure. The guidance uses Log4j as its worked example.
§8 — CBOM, QBOM and the PQC transition
This is the section that matters for quantum readiness, and the one most vendors treat most thinly. In CERT-In's own clauses:
- §8.4.1.1 — government, public-sector and essential-services organisations shall require a CBOM for cryptographic assets and a QBOM for quantum systems in all related procurements, developments and integrations.
- §8.4.1.2 — suppliers of software, systems or devices involving cryptographic or quantum technologies must provide a complete CBOM and/or QBOM for the delivered solution.
- §8.4.1.13 — workflows must keep the CBOM/QBOM updated as components, algorithms or quantum technologies are introduced, modified or deprecated.
- §8.4.2.8 — scheduled reviews, at least quarterly, to verify accuracy and completeness.
- §8.5.4 — tiered vendor PQC contractual requirements: quarterly migration progress reports with C-level executive attestation, and penalty clauses for non-compliance.
The minimum-element tables under §8.3 are specific about cryptographic assets, and they are where a superficial CBOM shows itself:
| Asset type | Elements expected |
|---|---|
| Algorithms | Name · asset type · primitive · mode · cryptographic functions · classical security level · OID |
| Keys | Name · asset type · id · state · size · creation date · activation date |
| Protocols | Name · asset type · version · cipher suites · OID |
| Certificates | Subject · issuer · not-valid-before · not-valid-after · signature algorithm reference · subject public key reference · certificate format · extensions |
Table 9 has no signature element. CERT-In lists ‘Attestations’ — a digital signature — among the QBOM elements (Table 8) and the AIBOM elements (Table 10). The same logic applies to a CBOM: unsigned, it cannot be checked by a third party — see the Declaration Test.
Object Identifiers are what let two systems agree that “ECDHE” in your inventory and “id-ecPublicKey” in a regulator's parser are the same thing. A CBOM that omits OIDs is readable by humans and opaque to machines — which defeats the purpose of a machine-readable bill of materials. Where an OID cannot be resolved from observation, the honest move is to omit the field, not to invent one.
§9 — AIBOM
The AI Bill of Materials inventories what a model is built from: the hardware used for training and inference (GPUs, accelerators, servers), the software (model name and version, ML frameworks, libraries), and the datasets and training-data sources, so provenance and licensing are documented. It is kept versioned alongside the model, because retraining changes the answer.
§10 — HBOM and provenance
The Hardware Bill of Materials covers physical components, sub-components and firmware, with an emphasis on provenance — capturing build origin and signing so a component's source can be verified, and checking signatures and attestations before accepting components. Unexpected component changes and unsigned artifacts are named as compromised-supplier indicators.
The clocks behind the guidance
| Date | What changes | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 09 Jul 2025 | CERT-In xBOM guidelines v2.0 published | CERT-In / MeitY |
| FY 2026–27 | Organisations begin requesting CBOMs from vendors | DST National Quantum Mission report, May 2026 |
| FY 2027–28 | DST roadmap recommends mandating vendor CBOM submission through procurement policy (advisory) | DST NQM report, May 2026 |
| After 2030 | RSA-2048 and ECC P-256 deprecated | NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026; all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, whatever the key size) |
| After 2035 | Those algorithms disallowed | NIST IR 8547 |
Note the language. 2030 is a deprecation deadline — after it, continued use is a risk decision the data owner must make — not a prediction that RSA-2048 breaks that year. Any vendor material that conflates the two is worth reading more sceptically.
Where KavachQ fits
| Clause | KavachQ |
|---|---|
| §3 / Table 5 — SBOM minimum elements | Generates CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM with identifiers, versions, licenses, hashes and dependency relationships, plus an SPDX 2.3 projection of the same document (unobserved fields are NOASSERTION, never guessed) |
| §3.2 — SDLC classes | Source and Analyzed classes from a source tree; Deployed-class evidence from live TLS and cloud-configuration reads |
| §6 — VEX / CSAF | VEX: OpenVEX 0.2.0; CSAF 2.0 VEX |
| §8 — CBOM | CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM carrying the Table 9 algorithm / key / protocol / certificate elements, with OIDs where they can be resolved and omitted where they cannot |
| §8 — Attestations | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) signature over an RFC 8785 canonicalisation, verifiable offline |
| §8 — Crypto-agility | Per-file agility metric (abstracted vs hard-coded crypto call sites) and a phased migration roadmap |
| §8 — QBOM | Signed CycloneDX QBOM (observed PQC use plus declared quantum devices) |
| §9 — AIBOM | Signed CycloneDX AIBOM — declared models plus observed model files and model-API calls |
| §10 — HBOM | Signed CycloneDX HBOM from your declared hardware registry, linked to the CBOM |
| Procurement | Vendor self-declaration builder — see the 13-column field kit |
This page is a map, not a substitute. The authoritative text is CERT-In's own Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, Version 2.0, dated 09.07.2025, published at cert-in.org.in. Where this page and the guideline differ, the guideline is right.
Related: What a CBOM actually is · The Declaration Test · India's PQC migration roadmap