IndiaCERT-In v2.0 · 09 Jul 2025

CERT-In xBOM Guidelines v2.0

On 09 July 2025 CERT-In, the national CERT under MeitY, published Version 2.0 of its Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM. It is India's reference document for software-supply-chain transparency, and it is the text your tender annexure is quietly copied from.

At a glance

Published09 July 2025 (v1.0 was October 2024)
Issued byCERT-In, under MeitY
ScopeFive bill-of-materials types: SBOM, CBOM, QBOM, AIBOM, HBOM
StatusAdvisory — but referenced by sectoral regulators and copied into tenders
Recommended forPublic sector, government, essential services, software exporters
FormatsMachine-readable: CycloneDX or SPDX
WHY "ADVISORY" IS THE WRONG WORD TO RELAX ABOUT

Guidance becomes binding the moment a procurement officer pastes it into an annexure. At least one public-sector bank tender on GeM (Punjab & Sind Bank, 2026) requires SBOM and CBOM as contractual deliverables — with quarterly refresh obligations and material-breach language. For a vendor bidding into those, the guidelines are not advisory; they are the contract.

§3 and Table 5 — the SBOM minimum elements

Table 5 lists the fields every SBOM must carry, per component. A compliant SBOM is generated, not maintained by hand, and is complete down to transitive dependencies.

ElementWhat it means in practice
Component nameEvery component, not just direct ones
VersionExact version, not a range
Unique identifierPURL or CPE, so the row is machine-resolvable
Supplier / authorWho ships it — the provenance anchor
Dependency relationshipsTop-level and transitive; this is where hand-made SBOMs fail
LicensePer component, including open-source terms
Cryptographic hashMakes the entry verifiable rather than assertable
TimestampPoint-in-time — an SBOM is a photograph, not a portrait
Known unknownsExplicitly flag where completeness could not be established

The last element is the one most tools skip, and it is the most important for an auditor. A bill of materials that silently omits what it could not see is worse than one that says so.

§3.2 — the six SDLC SBOM classes

The guidelines tie SBOM generation to the software lifecycle. Each class answers a different assurance question, and most teams have all their coverage at the front of the list.

ClassAnswers
DesignWhat we intend to build with
SourceWhat the repository declares
BuildWhat the pipeline actually assembled
AnalyzedWhat analysis of the build output found
DeployedWhat was shipped to the environment
RuntimeWhat is actually loaded and executing

§6 — VEX and CSAF, not raw scan dumps

Vulnerability state must be communicated through VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) statements — affected, not affected, fixed, under investigation — and machine-readable CSAF advisories. The intent is to end the practice of forwarding a 12,000-line scanner export and calling it disclosure. The guidance uses Log4j as its worked example.

§8 — CBOM, QBOM and the PQC transition

This is the section that matters for quantum readiness, and the one most vendors treat most thinly. In CERT-In's own clauses:

  1. §8.4.1.1 — government, public-sector and essential-services organisations shall require a CBOM for cryptographic assets and a QBOM for quantum systems in all related procurements, developments and integrations.
  2. §8.4.1.2 — suppliers of software, systems or devices involving cryptographic or quantum technologies must provide a complete CBOM and/or QBOM for the delivered solution.
  3. §8.4.1.13 — workflows must keep the CBOM/QBOM updated as components, algorithms or quantum technologies are introduced, modified or deprecated.
  4. §8.4.2.8 — scheduled reviews, at least quarterly, to verify accuracy and completeness.
  5. §8.5.4 — tiered vendor PQC contractual requirements: quarterly migration progress reports with C-level executive attestation, and penalty clauses for non-compliance.

The minimum-element tables under §8.3 are specific about cryptographic assets, and they are where a superficial CBOM shows itself:

Asset typeElements expected
AlgorithmsName · asset type · primitive · mode · cryptographic functions · classical security level · OID
KeysName · asset type · id · state · size · creation date · activation date
ProtocolsName · asset type · version · cipher suites · OID
CertificatesSubject · issuer · not-valid-before · not-valid-after · signature algorithm reference · subject public key reference · certificate format · extensions

Table 9 has no signature element. CERT-In lists ‘Attestations’ — a digital signature — among the QBOM elements (Table 8) and the AIBOM elements (Table 10). The same logic applies to a CBOM: unsigned, it cannot be checked by a third party — see the Declaration Test.

AN OID IS NOT DECORATIVE

Object Identifiers are what let two systems agree that “ECDHE” in your inventory and “id-ecPublicKey” in a regulator's parser are the same thing. A CBOM that omits OIDs is readable by humans and opaque to machines — which defeats the purpose of a machine-readable bill of materials. Where an OID cannot be resolved from observation, the honest move is to omit the field, not to invent one.

§9 — AIBOM

The AI Bill of Materials inventories what a model is built from: the hardware used for training and inference (GPUs, accelerators, servers), the software (model name and version, ML frameworks, libraries), and the datasets and training-data sources, so provenance and licensing are documented. It is kept versioned alongside the model, because retraining changes the answer.

§10 — HBOM and provenance

The Hardware Bill of Materials covers physical components, sub-components and firmware, with an emphasis on provenance — capturing build origin and signing so a component's source can be verified, and checking signatures and attestations before accepting components. Unexpected component changes and unsigned artifacts are named as compromised-supplier indicators.

The clocks behind the guidance

DateWhat changesSource
09 Jul 2025CERT-In xBOM guidelines v2.0 publishedCERT-In / MeitY
FY 2026–27Organisations begin requesting CBOMs from vendorsDST National Quantum Mission report, May 2026
FY 2027–28DST roadmap recommends mandating vendor CBOM submission through procurement policy (advisory)DST NQM report, May 2026
After 2030RSA-2048 and ECC P-256 deprecatedNIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026; all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, whatever the key size)
After 2035Those algorithms disallowedNIST IR 8547

Note the language. 2030 is a deprecation deadline — after it, continued use is a risk decision the data owner must make — not a prediction that RSA-2048 breaks that year. Any vendor material that conflates the two is worth reading more sceptically.

Where KavachQ fits

ClauseKavachQ
§3 / Table 5 — SBOM minimum elementsGenerates CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM with identifiers, versions, licenses, hashes and dependency relationships, plus an SPDX 2.3 projection of the same document (unobserved fields are NOASSERTION, never guessed)
§3.2 — SDLC classesSource and Analyzed classes from a source tree; Deployed-class evidence from live TLS and cloud-configuration reads
§6 — VEX / CSAFVEX: OpenVEX 0.2.0; CSAF 2.0 VEX
§8 — CBOMCycloneDX 1.7 CBOM carrying the Table 9 algorithm / key / protocol / certificate elements, with OIDs where they can be resolved and omitted where they cannot
§8 — AttestationsML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) signature over an RFC 8785 canonicalisation, verifiable offline
§8 — Crypto-agilityPer-file agility metric (abstracted vs hard-coded crypto call sites) and a phased migration roadmap
§8 — QBOMSigned CycloneDX QBOM (observed PQC use plus declared quantum devices)
§9 — AIBOMSigned CycloneDX AIBOM — declared models plus observed model files and model-API calls
§10 — HBOMSigned CycloneDX HBOM from your declared hardware registry, linked to the CBOM
ProcurementVendor self-declaration builder — see the 13-column field kit
READ THE SOURCE

This page is a map, not a substitute. The authoritative text is CERT-In's own Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, Version 2.0, dated 09.07.2025, published at cert-in.org.in. Where this page and the guideline differ, the guideline is right.

Related: What a CBOM actually is · The Declaration Test · India's PQC migration roadmap

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A CBOM that answers §8, signed

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