AIBOM
Inventory & BOMsAI Bill of Materials · ML-BOM
A list of the components used to build, train and deploy AI models — models, data, software and hardware. CERT-In's v2.0 guidelines set 19 minimum elements.
The terms you'll meet in a post-quantum migration — the NIST algorithms, the threat, the inventories regulators ask for, and the policies that set the dates. Every entry links to a deeper explanation, and every date is checked against its source.
49 terms
AI Bill of Materials · ML-BOM
A list of the components used to build, train and deploy AI models — models, data, software and hardware. CERT-In's v2.0 guidelines set 19 minimum elements.
Cryptographic Bill of Materials
A machine-readable inventory of cryptographic assets — algorithms, keys, protocols and certificates — and their dependencies. CERT-In's v2.0 guidelines list the per-asset elements for cryptographic assets in Table 9.
Technical Guidelines v2.0
CERT-In's Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, version 2.0, dated 9 July 2025: minimum elements and recommendations for five bills of materials, aimed at government, public-sector and essential-services organisations and their suppliers.
Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0
The NSA's 2022 algorithm suite for US national security systems: ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87, LMS and XMSS for software and firmware signing, AES-256 and SHA-384 or SHA-512, with transition targets running to 2035.
Cryptography based on the difficulty of decoding a general error-correcting code. HQC, NIST's backup key-encapsulation mechanism, is code-based.
SeeHQC
Cryptographic agility
The ability to replace cryptographic algorithms in protocols, applications, hardware and infrastructure without disrupting operations. NIST CSWP 39 (December 2025, updated in 2026) sets out strategies for achieving it.
Finding cryptography automatically: probing endpoints, capturing traffic, scanning code and configuration, and reading exports from key stores and platforms, to build a cryptographic inventory.
A record of where an organisation uses cryptography — algorithms, keys, protocols, certificates and libraries — and which systems depend on them. NIST IR 8547 names cryptographic inventories as the place a migration begins.
Also: cryptanalytically relevant
A quantum computer large and reliable enough to break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. None is known to exist today.
Common Security Advisory Framework
An OASIS standard (CSAF 2.0) for machine-readable security advisories. CERT-In's guidelines ask suppliers to follow a VEX with a CSAF advisory giving the detail.
ECMA-424
OWASP's bill-of-materials standard, also published by Ecma International as ECMA-424. Version 1.6 added native support for cryptographic assets, the basis of a CBOM; it also covers software, hardware, machine-learning models and VEX.
SeeCBOM guide
US federal directives that require the government's most sensitive systems to adopt post-quantum cryptography for key establishment by 31 December 2030 and for digital signatures by 31 December 2031, ahead of the 2035 target for the rest.
The standard against which cryptographic modules are tested and validated under the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), run by NIST and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
Planned FIPS 206 · derived from Falcon
FFT over NTRU-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm: a lattice signature with smaller signatures and keys than ML-DSA, but harder to implement safely. NIST is preparing it as FIPS 206; as of November 2026 no draft had been released for public comment.
Lov Grover's 1996 quantum search algorithm. It gives only a quadratic speed-up against brute-force key search, which is why symmetric cryptography is weakened rather than broken.
A tamper-resistant device that generates and protects keys and performs cryptographic operations. Whether an HSM supports post-quantum algorithms depends on its vendor's firmware and certification.
Store now, decrypt later
Recording encrypted data today in order to decrypt it once a CRQC exists. It makes data that must stay secret for years — financial, health, government — a problem now, not later.
Signatures whose security depends only on the properties of a hash function. SLH-DSA is stateless; LMS and XMSS are stateful.
Hardware Bill of Materials
An inventory of the physical components, sub-components and embedded devices in a hardware product. CERT-In's v2.0 guidelines set 20 rows, including sub-components.
Hamming Quasi-Cyclic
A code-based key-encapsulation mechanism that NIST selected for standardisation in March 2025, as a backup to ML-KEM built on different mathematics. Its standard has not yet been published.
Hybrid PQC
Combining a classical algorithm with a post-quantum one, so a connection stays secure as long as either of them holds. It is the usual way post-quantum key exchange is deployed in TLS today.
A way for two parties to agree a shared secret: one side encapsulates a fresh random key under the other's public key. ML-KEM and HQC are KEMs. NIST SP 800-227 (September 2025) gives recommendations for using them.
SeeML-KEM
Module-LWE · NTRU
Cryptography whose security rests on hard problems in high-dimensional lattices, such as Module Learning With Errors (Module-LWE) or NTRU lattices. ML-KEM and ML-DSA use Module-LWE; FN-DSA uses NTRU lattices.
Stateful hash-based signatures · NIST SP 800-208
Hash-based signature schemes approved in NIST SP 800-208 (2020) and suited to firmware and software signing. They are stateful: a signer must never reuse a one-time key, so its state has to be tracked carefully.
SeeCNSA 2.0
FIPS 204 · formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium
Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm, NIST's primary post-quantum signature. Parameter sets ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 sit at security categories 2, 3 and 5. KavachQ signs its CBOMs with ML-DSA-65.
FIPS 203 · formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber
Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism, NIST's primary standard for establishing a shared secret key. It comes in three parameter sets — ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 — at NIST security categories 1, 3 and 5.
X + Y > Z
Michele Mosca's rule of thumb: if the years your data must stay secret (X) plus the years your migration will take (Y) exceed the years until a CRQC arrives (Z), you are already exposed.
India · DST
India's Department of Science and Technology programme for quantum technologies, approved in April 2023. A DST task-force roadmap sets advisory PQC migration targets: 2029 for critical information infrastructure (CII) and 2033 for other enterprises.
Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
NIST's transition report, final on 27 October 2026. Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards after 2035, whatever their key size.
Categories 1–5
The five strength levels used to rate post-quantum parameter sets. Category 1 is at least as hard to break as an AES-128 key search, Category 3 as AES-192 and Category 5 as AES-256; Categories 2 and 4 are pegged to collision search on a 256-bit and a 384-bit hash function (SHA-256 and SHA3-384).
Quantum-resistant or quantum-safe cryptography
Public-key cryptography designed to resist attack by both classical and quantum computers while running on today's ordinary hardware. NIST published its first three PQC standards — FIPS 203, 204 and 205 — on 13 August 2024.
A phased, dated plan for replacing quantum-vulnerable cryptography with post-quantum algorithms, usually prioritised by how long the data must stay secret and how exposed each system is.
The certificate authorities, certificates and policies that bind public keys to identities. Moving a PKI to post-quantum signatures is often one of the longest parts of a migration.
An informal name for the day a CRQC can break today's public-key cryptography. Nobody knows when it will come; dates such as NIST's 2030 and 2035 are policy deadlines, not predictions of it.
SeeNIST IR 8547
Quantum Bill of Materials
In CERT-In's v2.0 guidelines, an inventory of quantum devices and systems and of components related to quantum computing and quantum-safe cryptography. It is not where your quantum-vulnerable cryptography is listed — that is the CBOM — although its Table 8 points to Table 9 for any cryptographic assets it covers.
Using quantum states of light to share keys so that eavesdropping can be detected. It needs dedicated hardware and links and does not authenticate on its own; agencies including the US NSA and the UK NCSC recommend post-quantum cryptography instead.
SeePQC vs QKD
A device that draws random numbers from a quantum process. Quantum devices such as QRNGs and QKD links are what a QBOM inventories.
The basic unit of quantum information. Breaking RSA needs error-corrected logical qubits, each built from many physical qubits — one reason estimates of Q-Day vary so widely.
RSA · DH · ECDH · ECDSA · EdDSA
The public-key algorithms behind most of today's key exchange and digital signatures. Shor's algorithm would break all of them on a large enough quantum computer, and NIST IR 8547 disallows them after 2035.
Software Bill of Materials
A list of all the components, libraries and modules that make up a piece of software. CERT-In's v2.0 guidelines set 21 minimum data fields.
Peter Shor's 1994 quantum algorithm for factoring and discrete logarithms. On a CRQC it breaks RSA, Diffie–Hellman and elliptic-curve cryptography.
FIPS 205 · formerly SPHINCS+
Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm. Its security rests only on the strength of hash functions, which makes it a conservative choice, but its signatures are far larger than ML-DSA's.
ISO/IEC 5962:2021
The Linux Foundation's Software Package Data Exchange standard for SBOMs, published as ISO/IEC 5962:2021. SPDX 3.0 adds profiles for AI and datasets.
AES · SHA-2 · SHA-3
Symmetric ciphers and hash functions are weakened, not broken, by quantum computers. NIST considers its symmetric primitives with at least 128 bits of classical security to meet Category 1; its few 112-bit symmetric standards are disallowed in 2030.
RFC 9846 (formerly RFC 8446)
The current version of the Transport Layer Security protocol and the one hybrid post-quantum key exchange is deployed in. US federal agencies must support it by 2 January 2030.
The signature side of HNDL: a signature trusted today — on firmware, a document or a certificate chain — could be forged once quantum-vulnerable signing keys can be recovered.
Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange
A statement from a supplier of whether a product is affected by a vulnerability. CERT-In's guidelines use four statuses: Not Affected, Affected, Fixed and Under Investigation.
SeeSBOM and VEX
TLS group 0x11EC
A hybrid key-exchange group for TLS 1.3 that combines X25519 with ML-KEM-768, registered with IANA as codepoint 0x11EC and standardised in RFC 10024. KavachQ's free scan reports whether a server negotiates it.
Shorthand for the family of bills of materials — SBOM, CBOM, QBOM, AIBOM and HBOM — each a structured, machine-readable inventory of one layer of a system.
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Dates and status were checked in November 2026 against NIST's publications, CERT-In's Technical Guidelines v2.0 and the standards bodies' own sites. Spotted something out of date? Write to hello@kavachq.in.
A free scan reads any public domain's TLS handshake and shows whether it already uses hybrid post-quantum key exchange.