Why “valid” has more than one meaning
A CBOM (cryptographic bill of materials) can be perfectly well-formed and still wrong. It can list RSA-2048 on a payments API that switched to a hybrid key exchange last quarter, or omit the mainframe nobody scanned. Validation therefore has two halves: checking the file, and checking whether the file describes reality.
This guide splits the work into six layers. The first three can run in a build pipeline. The last three need people, network access and a relationship with whoever produced the file. The checklist below summarises them; the sections that follow explain each one. For the format itself, see the CycloneDX CBOM format, field by field.
| Layer | Check | Pass looks like | Can a machine do it? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · Schema | Validate against the CycloneDX JSON schema for the declared specVersion | Zero errors; bomFormat is CycloneDX; every enum value is a listed one | Yes, fully |
| 2 · Required elements | Each asset carries the elements your rulebook needs (e.g. CERT-In Table 9 by asset type) | No algorithm without primitive, no certificate without validity dates, no key without size and state | Yes, with a rule list you write |
| 3 · Internal consistency | Every bom-ref is unique and every reference resolves to the right kind of asset; values are plausible | A certificate's signature-algorithm reference lands on an algorithm component; RSA keys are 2048 bits or more, not 7 | Mostly |
| 4 · Accuracy | Spot-check entries against live endpoints and configuration | The negotiated protocol version, key-exchange group and certificate match what the CBOM says | Partly; needs network access and a sample plan |
| 5 · Coverage and freshness | Know what was scanned, when, and what is explicitly unknown | A recent metadata.timestamp, a stated scope, and compositions marking incomplete areas | Partly; scope is a judgement |
| 6 · Integrity and provenance | Confirm who produced the file and that it has not changed | A signature that verifies against a key you trust, or an equivalent attestation | Yes, once keys are exchanged |
1. Schema validity
Start by validating the document against the official CycloneDX JSON schema for the version it declares. The schema requires only bomFormat (which must be CycloneDX) and specVersion at the top level[1], but it does enforce the crypto enums. In our own test against the 1.7 schema, an algorithmFamily of “Kyber” failed (the enum value is ML-KEM), and so did a nistQuantumSecurityLevel of 7, because the schema caps it at 6.
The official CycloneDX command-line tool has a validate command. Its documented options are --input-file, --input-format (json or xml), --input-version (v1_0 to v1_7, defaulting to v1_7) and --fail-on-errors, which returns a non-zero exit code so a build can stop on an invalid file[2]. Pass --input-version explicitly when you receive 1.6 files, so they are checked against the right schema.
In the same test, a 1.7 document with two components sharing one bom-ref, a certificate whose algorithm reference pointed to nothing, and a private key of 7 bits all passed schema validation with zero errors. The schema says every bom-ref “must be unique within the BOM”[1], but JSON Schema cannot enforce that. Layers 2 and 3 exist for this reason.
2. Required elements
Almost every crypto field in CycloneDX is optional; only assetType is required inside cryptoProperties[1]. So you need your own rulebook of what must be present. For organisations following CERT-In, Table 9 of the Technical Guidelines v2.0 is the natural baseline: 8 elements for algorithms, 7 for keys, 5 for protocols and 10 for certificates[4].
Write the rules per asset type, not per file. “The CBOM contains algorithms” is not a check. “Every algorithm component has primitive, cryptoFunctions, a classical security level and an OID” is. Report the gaps as a list of bom-refs so the producer can fix them. The full element-to-field mapping is on our QBOM and Table 9 page.
3. Internal consistency
A CBOM is a graph. Its value comes from links: a certificate to its signature algorithm, a key to its algorithm, a protocol's cipher suites to the algorithms they use, a library to what it provides. Check that:
- every
bom-refis unique, and every reference (signatureAlgorithmRef,subjectPublicKeyRef,algorithmRef, cipher-suitealgorithms, 1.7'srelatedCryptographicAssets, anddependencies) resolves; - it resolves to the right kind of thing — a certificate's signature-algorithm reference should land on a component whose
assetTypeisalgorithmand whoseprimitiveissignature, not on a key or a hash; - values are plausible: key
sizeis in bits[1], so an RSA key of 256 is probably a byte count; a certificate'snotValidAfteris later thannotValidBefore; an algorithm named RSA does not claim a non-zeronistQuantumSecurityLevel; - sizes agree with the standard. FIPS 203 fixes an ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key at 1,184 bytes[3], so a recorded size of 1,184 bits points to a unit error.
4. Accuracy against reality
A file can pass every check above and still be fiction. Pick a sample of entries and verify them independently. For network-facing services, complete a TLS handshake with the endpoint and record the negotiated protocol version, the key-exchange group, and the certificate's subject, expiry and signature algorithm. Compare them with the CBOM's protocol and certificate components. CycloneDX 1.7 lets a cipher suite record tlsGroups and tlsSignatureSchemes[1], which makes this comparison direct.
For internal systems, compare against configuration: the cipher list a server is set to offer, the key-store contents, the HSM (hardware security module) key inventory. Sample risk-first — payment rails, customer authentication, long-lived data — and record the result of each spot-check so the next review can build on it. A mismatch rate tells you more about a CBOM than its size does.
5. Coverage and freshness
Two CBOMs with 40 entries each can mean very different things if one covers a whole estate and the other a single service. Ask what was scanned, by which method, and when. metadata.timestamp records when the BOM was created[1]. The compositions array lets a producer state how complete each part of the inventory is, using values such as complete, incomplete, unknown and not_specified[1]. An honest “incomplete” is more useful than silent omission.
CERT-In says organisations “must maintain an accurate and up-to-date CBOM/QBOM” and that workflows must update it as components and algorithms change (§8.4.1.3, §8.4.1.13)[4]. Set a maximum age for any CBOM you rely on, and treat an old file as a coverage gap. For how to define evidence that stands up, see the CBOM evidence standard.
6. Integrity and provenance
CycloneDX supports an enveloped signature in JSON Signature Format (JSF) on the whole BOM[1]. The JSF schema CycloneDX ships names RSA, RSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA and HMAC algorithms (RS256 to ES512, Ed25519, Ed448, HS256 to HS512) and requires any other algorithm to be expressed as a URI[5]. Note that the signature on your post-quantum inventory is, by default, made with a quantum-vulnerable algorithm. That is acceptable for integrity today, but worth recording.
The CycloneDX command-line tool's verify all command checks the signatures in a BOM against a public key supplied as an RSA PEM file[2]. Whatever mechanism you use, obtain the producer's key through a separate channel.
CERT-In's QBOM elements in Table 8 include “Attestations: Digital signature for the QBOM to ensure authenticity and integrity”[4]. Table 9's CBOM elements do not list a signature themselves, but the guidelines ask that CBOM/QBOM data be protected with “encryption, access control, and data integrity mechanisms” (§8.4.1.12) and, for SBOMs, that digital signatures or encryption be used for integrity (§5.3.3.2)[4].
Questions to ask a supplier's CBOM
When the CBOM comes from a vendor, you cannot run layers 4 and 5 yourself, so ask. CERT-In says suppliers of software, systems or devices involving cryptography “must provide a complete CBOM and/or QBOM” (§8.4.1.2)[4]; how strictly that binds you depends on your regulator and contracts. A structured declaration, such as our vendor CBOM declaration, turns these questions into fields the supplier must fill.
| Question | Why it matters | Good answer |
|---|---|---|
Which specVersion, and does it validate? | An invalid file cannot be merged with your own inventory | 1.6 or 1.7, with the validation output attached |
| What was in scope, and what was not? | An empty CBOM and a CBOM of an unscanned product look identical | Named products, versions and environments; compositions for gaps |
| How was each entry found? | Source-code findings show what a library can do; runtime findings show what is used | Method per asset or per section: code, binary, configuration or network observation |
| Where does the product implement, and where does it only use, cryptography? | CERT-In asks for this distinction (§8.4.2.4) | provides for implementations, dependsOn for use |
| Which quantum-vulnerable algorithms remain, and is there a plan? | This is what you will report upwards | RSA, ECDH and ECDSA entries with nistQuantumSecurityLevel 0, each tied to a replacement plan |
| How often is it regenerated? | CERT-In expects CBOMs to be updated as components change (§8.4.1.13) | On every release, with version history |
| How is it signed? | Without integrity, a CBOM is an unverifiable claim | A signature or attestation you can verify, with the key delivered separately |
How KavachQ helps
KavachQ helps on both sides of a CBOM:
- Push an existing CBOM or scanner output in and it is scored and stored alongside your own scans.
- When it imports a BOM, it checks the signature on it, whether JSF, JWS, cosign/Sigstore or KavachQ's own, against your trust policy.
- The CBOMs it produces are signed with ML-DSA-65 and verifiable offline.
For questions to put to a vendor, try the Declaration Test.