What SAMA's circular asks for
On 27 August 2026 the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) issued Circular No. 482021280, now in force, requiring the financial institutions it supervises to prepare for the risks quantum computing poses to their cryptography, as an extension of its work on operational resilience. That covers banks, finance companies, payment service providers, credit information companies and financing-support entities.
| Deadline | What must be in place |
|---|---|
| 31 Dec 2026 | Accurate and comprehensive procedures for identifying and classifying all cryptographic assets: each mapped to the data, systems and services it protects, classified by sensitivity and migration priority, with the cryptographic resilience of priority assets and their third-party dependencies assessed. |
| 31 Mar 2027 | An enterprise-level quantum risk assessment, with action plans. |
Two details matter for planning. The circular names no specific algorithm; in Saudi Arabia, national algorithm requirements sit with the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA). And it requires no submission to SAMA, so expect to show the work during supervisory review. That makes the quality of the evidence, not the act of filing, the real test.
Read the official circular on the SAMA Rulebook alongside this summary and your own compliance team.
Why "an inventory" is harder than it sounds
A spreadsheet of certificates won't meet the bar. SAMA asks for cryptographic assets linked to the data, systems and services they protect, classified by migration priority, with third-party dependencies assessed. That requires knowing which application uses which key, which algorithm protects which class of customer data, and which of those paths are reachable from the internet. Cryptography also hides in source code, configuration, keystores, cloud key services and third-party components, not only in TLS endpoints. Our CBOM guide explains why two discovery tools can disagree by orders of magnitude on the same estate.
What KavachQ produces for each requirement
This is our reading of the circular, not a certified mapping: KavachQ does not certify compliance, and SAMA decides what it accepts.
| SAMA expects | What KavachQ produces |
|---|---|
| All cryptographic assets identified | Discovery across public TLS endpoints, source code and configuration, cloud key and certificate exports, and PKCS#12 keystores, plus certificates you supply, into a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM |
| Linked to data, systems and services | A dependency graph from each application to the algorithm families it relies on |
| Third-party dependencies | Ingest of the SBOMs and CBOMs your suppliers provide, in the same graph |
| Classified by sensitivity and migration priority | A T1–T4 risk tier per asset, weighing algorithm strength, exposure and harvest-now risk, and a 0–100 readiness score for the estate |
| Risk assessment and action plans (Mar 2027) | A phased migration plan to ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and a board pack |
| Evidence you can show in supervisory review | CBOM exports signed with ML-DSA, verifiable offline without access to your estate |
| Data stays in the Kingdom | Self-hosted in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped. Client estates never leave your environment |
If you're starting now
The time left is tight but workable if you put coverage before polish. An indicative sequence:
- Scope and an outside-in baseline. Agree the in-scope entities and systems, and scan your public endpoints to see what is negotiated on the wire. Our free scan is a start.
- Extend discovery inside your environment. Scan source code and configuration, cloud key and certificate exports and keystores, and collect supplier SBOMs and CBOMs — starting with payments and customer-data systems.
- Classify and prioritise. Tie assets to systems, data classes and suppliers, then score and tier them. This is what turns a list into an inventory SAMA will recognise.
- Freeze, sign, govern. Sign the CBOM baseline, assign owners, and set the cadence that keeps it current. That baseline becomes the input to the March 2027 risk assessment.
United Arab Emirates: the National Encryption Policy
The UAE announced its National Encryption Policy and executive regulation in November 2025. It sets encryption controls — including key management and post-quantum cryptography — for organisations handling critical and personal data, and it requires government entities to adopt clear, officially approved plans to transition to post-quantum cryptography, overseen by the UAE Cyber Security Council. No public submission date has been announced.
In May 2026 the Council launched a national Crypto Discovery Tool for critical public and private entities under its post-quantum migration programme. The building blocks are the same as in Saudi Arabia: an inventory, a risk-ranked plan and evidence of progress. Suppliers to UAE government entities should expect the requirement to reach them through procurement.
The rest of the GCC
In Saudi Arabia, the NCA has also consulted on an updated National Cryptographic Standard (NCS-2:2025) that would require cryptographic systems to support post-quantum algorithms. Check the final text with the NCA before relying on it.
As of November 2026 we haven't found PQC deadlines from the other GCC central banks (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman). SAMA's circular is the clearest template so far. We track changes in the World Tracker.
We're scoping pilots with institutions working to the 31 December deadline: discovery inside your environment, a signed CBOM baseline, and a prioritised register you can take into the March 2027 risk assessment. Scope a pilot →
Sources: SAMA Circular No. 482021280, 27 Aug 2026; UAE Government portal, National Encryption Policy; WAM, Nov 2025. This page summarises public material for orientation and is not legal advice.