Why this lands on the supplier, not the bank
The regulated entity owns the obligation, but it discharges it by pushing the deliverable down the chain. The bank does not have your source tree; you do. So the clause is written as a supplier deliverable, and the enforcement mechanism is contractual — refresh it every quarter or be in breach.
That has an awkward consequence for a supplier with a lean engineering team: this becomes a recurring compliance job, on someone else's schedule, for every customer that adopts the clause. Done by hand in a spreadsheet it is a week of work per refresh, and it decays the moment a dependency updates.
The thirteen columns
Column names below follow the tender's own wording. The source column is the honest part: it says where a cell can legitimately come from — which is what tells you what a tool can and cannot do for you.
| # | Column | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Component / software name | SBOM + CBOM |
| 2 | Version and supplier / manufacturer | SBOM |
| 3 | Component type (application / library / firmware / container…) | SBOM |
| 4 | Dependency type (direct / transitive) | SBOM |
| 5 | Licence details (including open-source) | SBOM |
| 6 | Usage / purpose within the system | You |
| 7 | Cryptographic assets / algorithms used (for CBOM) | CBOM |
| 8 | Key length / strength (where applicable) | CBOM |
| 9 | Known vulnerabilities (CVE details, if any) | SBOM |
| 10 | Compliance status (CERT-In / RBI / industry standards) | Derived |
| 11 | Last update / review date | Derived |
| 12 | Applicability (Yes / Not Applicable, with justification) | You |
| 13 | Risk / mitigation measures (if applicable) | Derived + you |
“What this component is for” and “does this requirement apply to us, and why not if not” are business statements made under your letterhead and your liability. Column 13 can start from the evidence, but “what we commit to doing about the risk” is still yours to confirm. Any vendor whose tool auto-fills those is generating text you will have to defend in an audit. Ours leaves column 12 at review_required until a human decides.
What a good declaration looks like
- One row per component, no duplicates. A component observed through two evidence paths should collapse to one row. Duplicated rows read as sloppiness before anyone checks the content.
- Gaps declared, not hidden. If no SBOM was supplied, columns 2–5 and 9 cannot be answered — the declaration should name the outstanding columns rather than fill them with plausible text.
- Cryptography that is specific. “TLS” is not a cryptographic asset. RSA-2048, SHA1withRSA, 3DES with the file and line where each is used — that is a cryptographic asset.
- Classically broken flagged separately from quantum-exposed. 3DES, DES and SHA-1 are not future problems. Folding them into a “post-quantum” bucket understates them.
- Provenance for every cell. An auditor's next question after “what does this row say” is “how do you know”. A provenance table answers it once, in writing.
Producing it without installing anything
On a supplier's site there is usually no spare IT capacity and no appetite for installing a vendor's agent on a build machine. So the collection step is a read-only pass, run from a laptop, over three inputs: a source tree, a certificate directory, and a dependency manifest. Two commands:
1. Collect — read-only, offline, nothing installed on your systems, nothing transmitted.
2. Build the submission — merges the staged evidence into one table and emits CSV, HTML and a provenance CSV, plus a coverage report naming every column still outstanding.
The output is the table above, the machine-readable CycloneDX SBOM and CBOM that accompany it, and — if you want it — an ML-DSA-65 signature over the CBOM so the bank's auditor can verify the file has not been altered since you signed it, without calling anyone.
A one-off declaration is a bad week. A quarterly declaration, per customer, is a standing obligation — and the quarter it slips is the quarter it becomes a contractual issue. The reason to automate this is not the first submission; it is the eighth.
Scope, and what we will not claim
- In scope today: a CBOM (CycloneDX 1.7) signed with ML-DSA-65 that the receiving auditor can verify offline, plus an SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 and SPDX 2.3 (not signed on its own), OpenVEX 0.2.0 and CSAF 2.0 VEX statements for column 9's CVEs, and the merged declaration with per-cell provenance.
- We cannot make you compliant. We can make your evidence complete, honest and verifiable; the declaration is still yours.
- Columns 6 and 12 stay blank until a human at your organisation fills them.
- Nothing here is legal advice on your tender obligations. Read the clause; the clause governs.
Column-by-column: which cell comes from which evidence source, who owns it, and why column 10 has no “compliant” value — the CBOM Evidence Standard.
Related: CERT-In xBOM Guidelines v2.0 · What a CBOM actually is · The Declaration Test — five questions for any CBOM vendor