CERT-In's Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM v2.0 define what a cryptographic inventory must contain. Bank procurement has started enforcing it: at least one public-sector bank tender on GeM (Punjab & Sind Bank, 2026) requires bidders to submit an SBOM and a CBOM plus a 13-column self-declaration on letterhead — before deployment, then quarterly or within 15 days of any material change, with non-compliance classified as a material breach. This page describes how KavachQ produces that evidence, which columns a tool may honestly fill, and which only the vendor can sign.
| # | Column | Evidence source | Who signs |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Component / software name | SBOM + cryptographic scan | KAVACHQ |
| 02 | Version, supplier / manufacturer | SBOM (supplier, else publisher) | KAVACHQ |
| 03 | Component type | SBOM type / SPDX purpose | KAVACHQ |
| 04 | Dependency type (direct / transitive) | SBOM dependency graph — left unfilled when the file cannot support the claim | KAVACHQ |
| 05 | License details | SBOM licenses (SPDX concluded → declared) | KAVACHQ |
| 06 | Usage / purpose within the system | Business knowledge — no tool can know this | VENDOR |
| 07 | Cryptographic assets / algorithms | Crypto graph; CERT-In xBOM v2.0 Table 9 elements incl. OIDs | KAVACHQ |
| 08 | Key length / strength | Crypto graph | KAVACHQ |
| 09 | Known vulnerabilities (CVE) | SBOM vulnerability records, where carried | KAVACHQ |
| 10 | Compliance status | Derived from evidence classification (vocabulary overleaf) | KAVACHQ |
| 11 | Last update / review date | Scan timestamp | KAVACHQ |
| 12 | Applicability — Yes / N.A. with justification | Vendor judgement; an unjustified "N.A." is refused on the row | VENDOR |
| 13 | Risk / mitigation measures | Migration path where known | KAVACHQ + VENDOR |
A scan evidences exposure and serves as the inventory artifact CERT-In requires; it cannot discharge an organisational obligation. So the status vocabulary states only what the evidence supports:
| Value | Means |
|---|---|
| exposure_evidenced_quantum_vulnerable | Quantum-vulnerable cryptography directly observed. |
| exposure_inferred_quantum_vulnerable | Inferred from a dependency name — weaker evidence, labelled as such, needs confirmation. |
| exposure_evidenced_classically_broken | Broken today (DES, 3DES, MD5, SHA-1). More urgent than any quantum timeline. |
| weakened_under_grover | Grover's algorithm halves effective strength (e.g. AES-128). |
| pqc_algorithm_observed | An actual FIPS 203 / 204 / 205 algorithm observed in use. |
| not_quantum_vulnerable | Strong classical cryptography (e.g. AES-256). Not the same as PQC. |
| known_cve_recorded | The SBOM records a CVE against the component. |
| no_crypto_observed_not_assessed | Nothing observed. Absence of observation ≠ absence of cryptography. |
Nothing installed on vendor systems. Source, binaries, certificates and manifests read in place; SBOM built natively (Maven, npm, pip, NuGet, Go) or carried through from a supplier.
Crypto assets mapped to CERT-In CBOM elements with OIDs; exposure classified per the column-10 vocabulary above.
Letterhead declaration + CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM, ML-DSA-65-signed (FIPS 204). Stable row keys — vendor answers survive the quarterly refresh.
SBOM + CBOM + 13-column declaration, evidence-backed, in days — not weeks. One read-only visit populates both halves. Write via kavachq.in.