GuideSBOMCERT-In v2.0 · §1–7

What is an SBOM?

Most of CERT-In's Technical Guidelines v2.0 (July 2025) are about the SBOM: seven of its ten chapters. Here is what they ask for — the 21 data fields, the levels and classes of SBOM, how vulnerabilities are reported — with a schema-valid sample you can download.

The definition, in CERT-In's words

The guidelines open with it: a Software Bill of Materials is a “list of all the components, libraries, and modules that make up a software, providing transparency into its composition.” Software is built from many parts, some from third parties, and each can carry a vulnerability. An SBOM tells you which parts you have, so that when one turns out to be vulnerable you know where it is.

The guidelines are addressed to government, public-sector and essential-services organisations, and to organisations in software exports and the software services industry (§2.2). They cover software development, supply-chain management, cybersecurity, regulatory compliance, risk management and interoperability.

The 21 data fields

Table 5 sets three kinds of minimum element. The first is data fields: the baseline information to track for every component, defined one by one in §4.2. Pick a field to see what CERT-In asks for, an illustrative value for a payments API, and where it sits in a CycloneDX document. The sample on the right is a real, schema-valid CycloneDX 1.6 file — the highlighted lines change as you go.

Turn on JavaScript to explore the fields, or read the full list in §4.2 of the guidelines.


        
sbom-example.cdx.json · CycloneDX 1.6 · validated against the official schemaDownload the sample
Figure 1 · Table 5 data fields with an illustrative payments API. Component names, suppliers, hashes and the advisory are fictional, for teaching only. Fields without a native CycloneDX field are carried as named properties. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, Table 5 and §4.2, pp. 21–24.

The unique identifier, part by part

Field 21 gets its own treatment earlier in the guidelines (§3.3.2.2, Tables 3 and 4). CERT-In structures the identifier as pkg:supplier/OrganizationName/ComponentName@Version?qualifiers&subpath, in the style of a Package URL, and explains that it stays valid even if a project changes owner or is rebranded. Here is CERT-In's own example, taken apart:

pkg:supplier/ApacheSoftwareFoundation/ApacheTomcat@9.0.71?arch=x86_64&os=linux#server/webapps

Figure 2 · The unique identifier for Apache Tomcat 9.0.71, CERT-In's example. In CycloneDX, a component's Package URL goes in purl. The Package URL specification puts the subpath after #, as CERT-In's example does, and has no registered supplier type — so the sample above uses PURL's generic type. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, Tables 3–4, p. 16.

How deep: five levels of SBOM

SBOMs differ in how far down they go (§3.1, Figure 2). CERT-In says organisations should choose one or more levels to balance transparency, risk management and operational efficiency:

Top-level · N-level · Delivery · Transitive · Complete

Figure 3 · Levels of SBOM. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, §3.1 and Figure 2, pp. 11–12.

CERT-In's advice is to use more than one: a tailored SBOM for consumers that meets their security needs without exposing sensitive data, and an internal SBOM at the “complete” level, from which vulnerability updates for that software are shared with the consumer periodically, on a mandatory basis.

When: six classes across the lifecycle

SBOMs are also classified by the stage of the software development lifecycle that produces them (§3.2) — from a plan of components that do not yet exist to what is actually loaded while the software runs:

Design · Source · Build · Analyzed · Deployed · Runtime

Figure 4 · SBOM classification aligned with SDLC stages. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, §3.2 and Figure 3, pp. 12–13.

The other two minimum elements

Table 5's second element is automation support: SBOMs should be machine-readable and generated automatically, so they scale across the software ecosystem. The formats it names are SPDX (Software Package Data Exchange) and CycloneDX. The third is practices and processes — how an organisation requests, generates and uses SBOMs. Table 5 names six areas for that procedure:

  • Frequency
  • Depth
  • Known Unknowns
  • Distribution and Delivery
  • Access Control
  • Accommodation of Mistakes

Sharing an SBOM safely

An SBOM is a map of your software, and §5.3 treats it that way. It asks for role-based access control, with read-only, edit and restricted access by role. It suggests keeping two versions: a public SBOM with non-sensitive information, and a private SBOM, which includes sensitive information such as vulnerabilities, for authorised parties only. SBOMs should travel over secure protocols such as HTTPS, with digital signatures or encryption for integrity and confidentiality (§5.3.3.2), and §5.4 recommends digitally signing the document when sharing it, so clients can confirm it is authentic and has not been tampered with.

When a vulnerability is found: VEX, then CSAF

An SBOM tells you a component is present. It does not tell you whether a newly disclosed vulnerability in that component can actually be exploited in the product. That is the job of a Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX) document, which the supplier issues after a vulnerability is discovered, followed by a Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory with the detail (§6). CERT-In illustrates the sequence with Log4j:

Discovery · VEX · CSAF · Patch · Updates · SBOM

Figure 5 · Vulnerability tracking and analysis in SBOM, step sequence. Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, §6 and Figure 7, pp. 35–36.

The four VEX statuses are CERT-In's. CycloneDX records the same idea in a vulnerability's analysis.state, with its own vocabulary — the sample above uses it:

CERT-In VEX statusWhat it means (§6)Closest CycloneDX 1.6 analysis.state
Not affectedNo remediation is required.not_affected
AffectedActions are recommended to remediate or address the vulnerability.exploitable
FixedThese product versions contain a fix.resolved
Under investigationNot yet known whether these versions are affected; an update will follow.in_triage

Table 1 · Source: CERT-In Technical Guidelines v2.0, §6, p. 35; CycloneDX 1.6 JSON schema (impactAnalysisState), which also defines resolved_with_pedigree and false_positive.

What §7 asks organisations to do

CERT-In's SBOM recommendations, in brief. Read the clause text in the guidelines for the exact wording.

  1. §7.1.1Government, public-sector and essential-services organisations, and organisations in software exports and services, should include SBOM requirements in all software procurement.
  2. §7.1.2All software supplied to government, public-sector and essential-services organisations must be accompanied by a complete SBOM.
  3. §7.1.3Those organisations must maintain SBOMs of the software they use, procure and develop.
  4. §7.1.4The SBOM of software supplied to government and the public sector must include the data fields in §4.2.
  5. §7.1.5Its format should be SPDX or CycloneDX.
  6. §7.1.6After a vulnerability is discovered, the supplier should issue a VEX document with one of the four statuses, then a CSAF advisory.
  7. §7.1.7Integrate SBOM data with vulnerability databases, CERT-In vulnerability notes and alerts, threat intelligence and vendor advisories.
  8. §7.1.8Consumers update their own SBOM to reflect patches or mitigations they apply.
  9. §7.1.9A separate SBOM for each software version, updated only when more component information arrives or errors are corrected.
  10. §7.1.10Consumers map and build an internal SBOM from the one the supplier provides.
  11. §7.1.11Security teams include the SBOM inventory in vulnerability-management workflows.
  12. §7.1.12Audit SBOM processes regularly for accuracy and completeness.
  13. §7.1.13Combine SBOM component data with VEX status for an up-to-date view of vulnerabilities.
  14. §7.1.14Store and transmit SBOM data securely — encryption, access controls and other measures.
  15. §7.1.15Update the SBOM as new components are introduced or existing ones are updated.

The best practices in §7.2 add, among others: capture detailed metadata, including unique identifiers (§7.2.1); build SBOM generation into the secure development lifecycle and CI/CD pipelines (§7.2.2); get assurances from vendors about the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of their SBOMs, and contracts that hold them to SBOM requirements (§7.2.12); keep VEX and CSAF advisories current with every change to the SBOM (§7.2.14); and list each instance of a component separately when the instances carry different metadata (§7.2.16).

CERT-In's guidelines use “should” and “must”, but they are technical guidelines; how they bind you depends on your regulator and your contracts. Public-sector bank tenders in India have begun asking suppliers for SBOM and CBOM declarations — see the Vendor Field Kit.

WHERE THE SBOM STOPS

An SBOM can tell you that a cryptographic library such as OpenSSL is in your software. It cannot tell you which algorithms, keys and certificates the software actually uses — and that is what decides your exposure to a quantum computer. That inventory is the CBOM, which CERT-In covers in §8 alongside the QBOM.

How KavachQ handles the SBOM

  • Builds or carries it. KavachQ builds an SBOM from your code's manifests, lockfiles and JAR files, or carries the CycloneDX or SPDX SBOM that you or your supplier provide.
  • Reads it for cryptography. It infers the cryptographic libraries an SBOM contains, so the software inventory feeds the CBOM.
  • Matches known vulnerabilities from an offline OSV snapshot, and exports VEX status in OpenVEX — whose four statuses are the four CERT-In names — and as a CSAF 2.0 VEX document.
  • Exports the SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 and SPDX 2.3. It adds nothing the component data does not hold — no guessed licences, suppliers or hashes — so fields your source SBOM lacks are left for you to fill. The SBOM your supplier generated remains the authoritative document.
  • Signing, honestly: the SBOM is not signed on its own. In KavachQ's CERT-In BOM pack, an ML-DSA (FIPS 204) signed manifest pins every file in the pack, the SBOM included, by its SHA-256 hash.

SBOM: frequently asked questions

What is an SBOM?

In CERT-In's Technical Guidelines v2.0 (9 July 2025), a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is a list of all the components, libraries and modules that make up a piece of software, providing transparency into its composition. Table 5 sets its minimum elements: 21 data fields, automation support through the SPDX and CycloneDX formats, and practices and processes for requesting, generating and using SBOMs.

What are the minimum data fields of an SBOM?

Section 4.2 of CERT-In's guidelines lists 21: component name, version, description, supplier, license, origin and dependencies; vulnerabilities; patch status; release date; end-of-life date; criticality; usage restrictions; checksums or hashes; comments or notes; author of SBOM data; timestamp; executable, archive and structured properties; and a unique identifier.

Which format should an SBOM use?

Section 7.1.5 says the SBOM of software supplied to government and public-sector organisations should be in Software Package Data eXchange (SPDX) or CycloneDX.

Who has to provide an SBOM?

Section 7.1.2 says all software supplied to government, public-sector and essential-services organisations must be accompanied by a complete SBOM, and section 7.1.1 asks those organisations, and organisations in software exports and services, to include SBOM requirements in all software procurement.

Does an SBOM have to be signed?

Table 5 has no signature field; field 14 records checksums or hashes of the component files. Section 5.3.3.2 asks for digital signatures or encryption to protect the integrity and confidentiality of SBOM data, and section 5.4 recommends digitally signing SBOM documents when sharing them.

What is the difference between an SBOM and a VEX document?

An SBOM lists the components in a piece of software. A Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX) document, issued after a vulnerability is discovered, states whether each product version is Not Affected, Affected, Fixed or Under Investigation. CERT-In asks suppliers to follow the VEX with a CSAF advisory that gives the description, affected versions, severity and mitigation.

How is an SBOM different from a CBOM?

An SBOM lists software components and libraries. A CBOM lists cryptographic assets — algorithms, keys, protocols and certificates — wherever they are used. An SBOM can show that a cryptographic library is present, but not which algorithms and keys the software actually uses; that is the CBOM's job, and it is where quantum-vulnerable cryptography is recorded.

From SBOM to CBOM

Find the cryptography inside your software

Start with a free scan of a public domain, then scope a pilot that turns your SBOM into a signed CBOM for a real slice of your estate.