Decision Framework

PQC vs QKD

Two different answers to two different problems. PQC replaces the public-key cryptography that quantum computers threaten; QKD is a physical way to share keys over a dedicated link. Here is when each fits, and when to combine them.

Mathematics-based

Post-Quantum Cryptography

Software algorithms believed to be hard for quantum computers.

  • Runs on existing classical infrastructure
  • NIST-standardised: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA
  • Works over the public internet
  • Drops into TLS, IKE, PKI, and code signing
  • Recommended by NSA, BSI, ANSSI, NCSC, ASD
Physics-based

Quantum Key Distribution

Physical key exchange whose security comes from quantum mechanics.

  • Requires dedicated fibre or satellite links
  • Detects eavesdropping at the physical layer
  • Bounded distance — needs trusted nodes
  • Piloted by some national programmes (e.g. India, China, EuroQCI); NSA, NCSC, ANSSI and BSI advise against relying on it
  • Hardware-heavy, low throughput
PropertyPQCQKD
FoundationHard mathematical problemsLaws of quantum physics
MediumSoftware, existing networksDedicated fibre or free-space links
RangeGlobal (anywhere TCP/IP runs)~100 km fibre · trusted nodes beyond
AuthenticationVia PQC signatures (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA)Requires classical authentication channel
ThroughputComparable to classicalkbps to low Mbps
CostSoftware upgradeSpecialist hardware + dark fibre
Mass deployabilityHighConstrained
Regulatory postureRecommended by most allied agenciesCaution — limited national use cases
Best fitPublic internet, enterprise, IoT, signaturesDedicated point-to-point links in national programmes that require it, alongside PQC
When to combine

Pure PQC

Use as the default. Internet-scale, enterprise, IoT, signatures — everywhere classical cryptography lives today.

PQC + Classical Hybrid

Transitional posture: run X25519 and ML-KEM together. If either holds, the channel remains safe.

PQC + QKD

Only where a national programme requires it, always with PQC authentication. NSA, NCSC, ANSSI and BSI advise against relying on QKD and recommend PQC.

Background — why the question even comes up
Shor's Algorithm

Breaks public-key crypto

Peter Shor's 1994 algorithm factors integers and computes discrete logs in polynomial time on a quantum computer. That collapses RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic-curve cryptography in one stroke — virtually every public-key scheme in use today.

Grover's Algorithm

Weakens, but doesn't break, symmetric crypto

Lov Grover's 1996 algorithm gives only a quadratic speed-up for unstructured search, and it parallelises poorly. NIST still treats AES-128 as meeting security category 1. AES-256 adds margin and is required by NSA's CNSA 2.0 for national security systems.

CRQC

The arrival threshold

A Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer is one with enough logical qubits, depth, and error correction to actually run Shor's algorithm against a real RSA-2048 or P-256 key. That's the moment classical public-key cryptography fails — not the qubit-count headlines.

India's stance is hybrid. PQC is the recommended primary path for broad enterprise migration. QKD is funded for sovereign backbones and continues as a strategic capability.

PQC vs QKD: frequently asked questions

What is the difference between PQC and QKD?

PQC (post-quantum cryptography) is a class of mathematical algorithms that run on classical computers and resist attack by quantum computers — it replaces RSA and ECC in software. QKD (quantum key distribution) is a physical-layer technique that uses quantum properties of photons to exchange a key between two endpoints connected by a special quantum link. PQC is software, broadly deployable, and standardised by NIST; QKD is hardware, point-to-point, and requires dedicated optical infrastructure.

Should Indian banks use PQC or QKD?

For nearly all banking, NBFC, and BFSI workloads — TLS to customers, internal authentication, code signing, document encryption, archive protection — post-quantum cryptography is the right choice because it works across the existing IP network. QKD needs dedicated point-to-point links, and NSA, NCSC, ANSSI and BSI advise against relying on it. Where a national programme requires QKD, it should run alongside PQC, always with PQC authentication. India's NQM and DST guidance treat PQC as the primary migration path.

Does PQC replace QKD?

They serve different purposes. PQC replaces today's classical public-key cryptography in nearly every software protocol. QKD addresses a narrower physics-layer key-exchange problem and complements PQC where the deployment can justify the optical infrastructure. Most enterprises will deploy PQC site-wide and QKD nowhere; QKD appears mainly where a national programme requires it, always alongside PQC authentication.

See India's roadmap Compare algorithms