RegionEuropean Union · NIS Cooperation Group · DORA

Europe's first post-quantum milestone is 31 December 2026

Since June 2025 EU Member States have had a common post-quantum roadmap. It is guidance, not law — but NIS2 entities are told to refer to it, and for high-risk use cases it says quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography shall not be used on its own after 2030.

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To the end of 31 December 2026, Brussels time — the roadmap's first milestone.

The timeline

Each date is labelled by what kind of instrument sets it: BindingGuidanceProposalRecommendation

  1. 11 Apr 2024

    Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 Recommendation

    Asks Member States to build a coordinated PQC roadmap through a sub-group of the NIS Cooperation Group. EUR-Lex

  2. 23 Jun 2025

    Coordinated Implementation Roadmap published Guidance

    Part 1, version 1.1, by the NIS Cooperation Group's PQC workstream. European Commission

  3. 20 Jan 2026

    NIS2 amendment proposed Proposal

    COM(2026) 13 would require national cybersecurity strategies to include policies for the transition to post-quantum cryptography. No adoption found as of 8 November 2026. EUR-Lex

  4. 15 Apr 2026

    Roadmap FAQ Guidance

    NIS2 entities should at a minimum inventory cryptographic assets, map dependencies, involve the supply chain and analyse quantum risk. No sector-specific guidance will follow. NIS CG FAQ

  5. 31 Dec 2026

    First steps everywhere Guidance

    “At least the First Steps have been implemented by all Member States”, initial national PQC roadmaps exist, and planning and pilots for high- and medium-risk use cases have started. Roadmap

  6. 31 Dec 2030

    High-risk use cases done Guidance

    The PQC transition for high-risk use cases is complete, planning and pilots for medium-risk use cases are done, and quantum-safe software and firmware upgrades are enabled by default. Roadmap

  7. 31 Dec 2035

    Medium-risk use cases done Guidance

    The PQC transition for medium-risk use cases is complete, and for low-risk use cases “as much as feasible”. Roadmap

What the roadmap is — and isn't

The Coordinated Implementation Roadmap is a non-binding paper by the NIS Cooperation Group, issued under Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101. It is addressed to Member States, and says public administrations and other critical infrastructure, “notably those in scope of the NIS2 Directive should refer to this document.” Member States turn it into national roadmaps, which is where any obligations on individual organisations are likely to come from.

The “first steps” due by the end of 2026

The roadmap's first milestone lists what every Member State should have under way: identify stakeholders; support mature cryptographic asset management; create dependency maps; perform a quantum risk analysis; include the supply chain; run a national awareness programme; take part in the EU workstream; and develop a timeline and an implementation plan. The April 2026 FAQ brings this down to the organisation: NIS2 entities should, “at a minimum”, “create an inventory of cryptographic assets and dependency maps, involve the supply chain, and perform a quantum risk analysis.”

What counts as high risk

A use case is high-risk “if compromising confidentiality after 10 years or more would still cause significant damage”. For those, the roadmap says “quantum-vulnerable public-key mechanisms shall not be used stand-alone after the end of 2030”; for medium-risk use cases the same applies after the end of 2035.

Hybrid schemes and QKD

The roadmap recommends “standardised and tested hybrid solutions, whenever feasible and suitable”, and national agencies go further:

  • The joint statement “Securing Tomorrow, Today” — signed by 18 Member States in November 2024 and by partners from 21 European states in its June 2025 update — strongly recommends hybrid PQC for most use cases, and protecting the most sensitive data against store-now-decrypt-later attacks by the end of 2030 at the latest.
  • Germany's BSI (TR-02102-1, January 2026) recommends classical key agreement on its own only until the end of 2031, moving very-high-protection applications by the end of 2030, and classical signatures only until the end of 2035 — with PQC used in hybrid form.
  • France's ANSSI (guide PG-083, March 2026) treats ML-KEM used without hybridisation as non-compliant with its rules.

On QKD the position is consistent: the roadmap FAQ says it “is currently not considered a viable quantum-safe alternative”, and a January 2024 position paper by the French, German, Dutch and Swedish agencies says the priority should be post-quantum cryptography in hybrid form.

Financial services: DORA

DORA is binding and has applied since 17 January 2025, but it never names quantum in its operative text. Its regulatory technical standards on ICT risk management (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774) require an encryption and cryptographic-controls policy (Art. 6(1)) that includes “provisions for updating or changing, where necessary, the cryptographic technology on the basis of developments in cryptanalysis” (Art. 6(4)), and a register of certificates for ICT assets supporting critical or important functions (Art. 7(4)). Quantum appears only in a recital, which is not binding: entities should deal with “the dynamic landscape of cryptographic threats, including threats from quantum advancements.” A cryptographic inventory is the practical way to show you can meet Art. 6(4).

Law in the pipeline

A proposed amendment to NIS2 (COM(2026) 13, January 2026) would require every Member State's national cybersecurity strategy to include policies for the transition to post-quantum cryptography. An EU Quantum Act has been announced but not yet proposed; the Quantum Europe Strategy (July 2025) is a policy document.

Where KavachQ fits

Every framework on this page starts in the same place: know where your cryptography is, rank it by risk, plan the move, and be able to show the evidence.

  • Inventory. KavachQ Discover builds a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM from live TLS and SSH probes, an in-network collector, code, configuration, keystores and certificates, and exports from cloud, HSM and other platforms.
  • Risk ranking. A T1–T4 quantum-risk tier for every asset, weighing harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure, and a 0–100 PQC-Ready score for each scan.
  • Plan. KavachQ Migrate builds a phased P0 / P1 / P2 plan with a replacement algorithm for each asset. Many national agencies in the EU expect hybrid key exchange during the transition — check your Member State's position.
  • Evidence. KavachQ Seal signs the CBOM with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), verifiable offline against our published trust anchor.
  • Your environment. Self-hosted in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped; your inventory stays inside your boundary.

KavachQ does not certify compliance with any framework on this page — the regulator or buyer decides what it accepts.

European Union: frequently asked questions

Is the EU post-quantum roadmap legally binding?

No. The Coordinated Implementation Roadmap is non-binding guidance from the NIS Cooperation Group, issued under a 2024 Commission Recommendation. Public administrations and NIS2 entities are told to refer to it, and Member States build national roadmaps from it. A January 2026 proposal would add PQC policies to national cybersecurity strategies under NIS2.

What are the EU's post-quantum deadlines?

By 31 December 2026, first steps and initial national roadmaps in all Member States. By 31 December 2030, the transition for high-risk use cases is complete. By 31 December 2035, the transition for medium-risk use cases is complete, and for low-risk use cases as far as feasible.

What should NIS2 entities do now?

According to the roadmap FAQ of April 2026, at a minimum: create an inventory of cryptographic assets and dependency maps, involve the supply chain, and perform a quantum risk analysis.

Does DORA require post-quantum cryptography?

Not by name. DORA's technical standards require financial entities to keep a cryptography policy that updates or changes cryptographic technology on the basis of developments in cryptanalysis, and to keep a register of certificates. Quantum is mentioned only in a non-binding recital.

Does the EU recommend hybrid post-quantum cryptography?

Yes. The roadmap recommends standardised and tested hybrid solutions whenever feasible and suitable, and national agencies such as BSI and ANSSI expect hybrid schemes. QKD is not considered a viable quantum-safe alternative.

Sources

Primary sources, checked on 8 November 2026. Read them alongside this summary and your own compliance team.

  1. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 (11 Apr 2024)
  2. NIS Cooperation Group — Coordinated Implementation Roadmap, Part 1 v1.1 (June 2025)
  3. NIS Cooperation Group — EU Roadmap on PQC FAQ (15 Apr 2026)
  4. Proposed NIS2 amendment COM(2026) 13 (20 Jan 2026)
  5. Quantum Europe Strategy COM(2025) 363
  6. DORA — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554
  7. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 — ICT risk-management RTS
  8. Joint statement “Securing Tomorrow, Today” (2025 update)
  9. ANSSI, BSI, NLNCSA, Swedish NCSA — QKD position paper (Jan 2024)
  10. BSI TR-02102-1 (2026-01)
  11. ANSSI guide PG-083 (20 Mar 2026)

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