What the roadmap is — and isn't
The Coordinated Implementation Roadmap is a non-binding paper by the NIS Cooperation Group, issued under Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101. It is addressed to Member States, and says public administrations and other critical infrastructure, “notably those in scope of the NIS2 Directive should refer to this document.” Member States turn it into national roadmaps, which is where any obligations on individual organisations are likely to come from.
The “first steps” due by the end of 2026
The roadmap's first milestone lists what every Member State should have under way: identify stakeholders; support mature cryptographic asset management; create dependency maps; perform a quantum risk analysis; include the supply chain; run a national awareness programme; take part in the EU workstream; and develop a timeline and an implementation plan. The April 2026 FAQ brings this down to the organisation: NIS2 entities should, “at a minimum”, “create an inventory of cryptographic assets and dependency maps, involve the supply chain, and perform a quantum risk analysis.”
What counts as high risk
A use case is high-risk “if compromising confidentiality after 10 years or more would still cause significant damage”. For those, the roadmap says “quantum-vulnerable public-key mechanisms shall not be used stand-alone after the end of 2030”; for medium-risk use cases the same applies after the end of 2035.
Hybrid schemes and QKD
The roadmap recommends “standardised and tested hybrid solutions, whenever feasible and suitable”, and national agencies go further:
- The joint statement “Securing Tomorrow, Today” — signed by 18 Member States in November 2024 and by partners from 21 European states in its June 2025 update — strongly recommends hybrid PQC for most use cases, and protecting the most sensitive data against store-now-decrypt-later attacks by the end of 2030 at the latest.
- Germany's BSI (TR-02102-1, January 2026) recommends classical key agreement on its own only until the end of 2031, moving very-high-protection applications by the end of 2030, and classical signatures only until the end of 2035 — with PQC used in hybrid form.
- France's ANSSI (guide PG-083, March 2026) treats ML-KEM used without hybridisation as non-compliant with its rules.
On QKD the position is consistent: the roadmap FAQ says it “is currently not considered a viable quantum-safe alternative”, and a January 2024 position paper by the French, German, Dutch and Swedish agencies says the priority should be post-quantum cryptography in hybrid form.
Financial services: DORA
DORA is binding and has applied since 17 January 2025, but it never names quantum in its operative text. Its regulatory technical standards on ICT risk management (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774) require an encryption and cryptographic-controls policy (Art. 6(1)) that includes “provisions for updating or changing, where necessary, the cryptographic technology on the basis of developments in cryptanalysis” (Art. 6(4)), and a register of certificates for ICT assets supporting critical or important functions (Art. 7(4)). Quantum appears only in a recital, which is not binding: entities should deal with “the dynamic landscape of cryptographic threats, including threats from quantum advancements.” A cryptographic inventory is the practical way to show you can meet Art. 6(4).
Law in the pipeline
A proposed amendment to NIS2 (COM(2026) 13, January 2026) would require every Member State's national cybersecurity strategy to include policies for the transition to post-quantum cryptography. An EU Quantum Act has been announced but not yet proposed; the Quantum Europe Strategy (July 2025) is a policy document.
Where KavachQ fits
Every framework on this page starts in the same place: know where your cryptography is, rank it by risk, plan the move, and be able to show the evidence.
- Inventory. KavachQ Discover builds a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM from live TLS and SSH probes, an in-network collector, code, configuration, keystores and certificates, and exports from cloud, HSM and other platforms.
- Risk ranking. A T1–T4 quantum-risk tier for every asset, weighing harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure, and a 0–100 PQC-Ready score for each scan.
- Plan. KavachQ Migrate builds a phased P0 / P1 / P2 plan with a replacement algorithm for each asset. Many national agencies in the EU expect hybrid key exchange during the transition — check your Member State's position.
- Evidence. KavachQ Seal signs the CBOM with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), verifiable offline against our published trust anchor.
- Your environment. Self-hosted in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped; your inventory stays inside your boundary.
KavachQ does not certify compliance with any framework on this page — the regulator or buyer decides what it accepts.