What your regulators expect
The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has not, in the documents we reviewed, set binding post-quantum requirements for operators. Its standards body, the Telecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC), has published two technical reports on the subject, and a product standard, TEC 91010:2026 Generic Requirements for Quantum-Safe Cryptographic Systems (Release 2, May 2026; listed by TEC as gazette-notified on 20 July 2026), that equipment vendors can be tested against[5]. The national roadmap from the Department of Science and Technology (DST) puts telecom on the fastest track. TEC's two technical reports and the DST roadmap are guidance; TEC 91010:2026 is a product standard, and how it is used in procurement or certification depends on DoT and the buyer. Together they are the clearest statement of what the sector will be measured against.
TEC 910018:2025: Migration to Post Quantum Cryptography
Released as Release 1.0 in January 2025, this technical report is addressed to "government organizations, industry and enterprises"[1]. Its main recommendations:
- Build a cryptographic inventory that lists algorithms and keys, distinguishes quantum-vulnerable algorithms from those that are not, and lists the applications and protocols that use them[1].
- Run a phased quantum-readiness programme: preparation, then discovery of "where and how public-key cryptography is used", then a quantum risk assessment that prioritises systems where migration time plus data shelf life exceeds the threat timeline (the Mosca model)[1].
- Target algorithms: AES-256, FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment, FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) for signatures, and at least SHA-256 or SHA3-256[1].
- Use hybrid schemes during transition, and validate PQC implementations in a test environment before deployment[1].
- Align vendors: ask OEMs about crypto-agility and PQC roadmaps, set milestones and request proofs of concept[1].
TEC 910028:2025: Quantum Secure 5G / beyond 5G Core using PQC
Also Release 1.0, January 2025, this report maps each 5G core mechanism to a post-quantum replacement[2]:
- mTLS between network functions on the service-based interface (SBI) to PQ-mTLS; classical signatures in X.509 certificates to ML-DSA.
- The ECIES scheme that conceals the subscriber identity (SUCI), which uses Curve25519 or secp256r1, to ML-KEM or a hybrid of ML-KEM and a classical algorithm.
- DTLS or IPsec on N2 and IPsec on N3 to post-quantum versions; AES-128 to AES-256, marked optional.
It calls updating roots of trust for firmware updates "of utter importance" and describes firmware update as "a very high-level target", and notes that base stations "are often deployed for decades". It prioritises 5G-AKA, SUPI concealment and SBI communication[2]. Because 5G-AKA itself is symmetric, we rank its migration below the public-key parts around it. Its scope is the 5G core only. It does not yet cover the RAN, edge nodes or IoT devices[2].
DST/NQM roadmap (May 2026)
The DST report lists telecom among critical information infrastructure (CII) sectors on an accelerated, advisory timeline. That means a preparatory stage (CBOM, quantum risk assessment) by 31 December 2027, migration of high-priority systems by 31 December 2028, and resilience for all systems by 31 December 2029[3]. It names the telecom sector as an "Urgent Adopter"[3]. It also recommends requesting CBOMs from vendors from FY 2026–27 and mandating them through procurement from FY 2027–28[3].
The report flags a sector-specific problem: PQC overhead is "problematic in microsecond-level environments (e.g., defence, telecom)"[3]. A TEC-led sub-group wrote its testing and certification framework, which says it "is not itself a regulatory mandate" and leaves enforcement to regulators[3]. NCCS-designated labs are among those that may be used for its Tier-2 testing[3].
Both TEC reports carry a notice that they "may be subject to revision". The DST roadmap is advisory. Licence conditions and DoT rules remain the binding layer; check them with your regulatory team before treating any date above as a compliance deadline.
Where the cryptography sits in a telecom operator
Precision matters here. 5G subscriber authentication (5G-AKA) is symmetric. It rests on a long-term key K, 128 bits in TEC's description, stored in the USIM and the operator's UDM, with the AES-based Milenage functions deriving the authentication and key material[2]. Shor's algorithm does not break this, and TEC proposes AES-256 as an optional upgrade, not an emergency[2]. The quantum-vulnerable parts sit around it: the elliptic-curve SUCI concealment, the PKI between network functions, and the public-key systems used to move and provision keys.
| System | Cryptography typically in use | Why it matters for quantum migration | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Network-equipment firmware and software signing | RSA or ECDSA signatures; hardware roots of trust | A forged update gives control of base stations or core nodes; roots of trust often cannot be changed after manufacture[2] | P0: decided at procurement, lives for decades |
| 5G core SBI and operator PKI | mTLS with ECDHE; X.509 certificates from a private CA | Every network-function call depends on it; TEC maps it to PQ-mTLS and ML-DSA[2] | P0: foundation for the rest of the core |
| Subscriber identity concealment (SUCI) | ECIES with X25519 or secp256r1, then AES-128 | Recorded SUCIs could later reveal permanent identities (SUPI). The authentication key K is not exposed | P1: privacy exposure, needs USIM and core changes together |
| SIM/eSIM provisioning and key transfer | Symmetric keys (K, OPc) at rest; public-key or certificate-based protection for files and remote provisioning, varying by vendor | Key files have a very long shelf life; any public-key wrapping recorded today is an HNDL target | P0: confirm with your SIM and eUICC vendors |
| 5G-AKA and NAS/AS ciphering | 128-bit symmetric key K, Milenage (AES), 128-NEA/NIA algorithms | Symmetric, so not broken by Shor; TEC suggests AES-256 options[2] | P2: track standards; no emergency |
| IPsec backhaul (N2, N3, RAN to core), inter-site links | IKEv2 with RSA/ECDSA authentication and (EC)DH key exchange | Long-lived tunnels carry user and control traffic; HNDL exposure on key exchange | P1: latency-sensitive, test hybrid first |
| Roaming and interconnect signalling | TLS or IPsec on interconnect links | Changes need partner coordination, so migration time is long | P1: start partner conversations early |
| OSS/BSS portals, enterprise APIs, customer apps | TLS with RSA/ECDSA certificates; OAuth/JWT signing | Customer PII and billing data; IT-style upgrades available soonest | P1: quick wins with vendor releases |
| Lawful and regulatory interfaces | Encrypted transport and authentication as specified by the requesting agency | High-sensitivity data; changes follow the agency's specifications | P1: inventory now, change on agency guidance |
Where to start
- Inventory public-key cryptography first. Follow TEC's discovery phase and record where RSA, ECC and Diffie-Hellman are used, across core, transport, IT and OSS/BSS[1]. Use CERT-In's per-asset elements (Table 9) as the record format[4]; see the CBOM guide and finding weak cryptography. Classify symmetric findings separately so AES-128 in 5G-AKA does not crowd out the real priorities.
- Put firmware signing and roots of trust into every network-equipment RFP. Ask for PQC signature support, crypto-agility and a dated roadmap, plus a CBOM. That moves you ahead of the DST timeline, which has CBOM requests starting in FY 2026–27[3]. See PQC procurement requirements and validating a CBOM.
- Score systems with the Mosca model. TEC 910018 uses it explicitly[1]. Subscriber key files and identity data have long shelf lives, and equipment has long migration times. See the Mosca inequality and harvest now, decrypt later.
- Lab-test PQ-mTLS and hybrid IKEv2 for latency. Given the DST warning about microsecond-level environments[3], measure handshake and throughput costs on SBI and backhaul before committing. Baseline public endpoints with the free TLS scan.
- Plan HSM and PKI refreshes against the 2027–2029 CII milestones on the India roadmap; see HSM procurement for PQC.
How KavachQ helps
- See the network's cryptography. Discover combines live TLS and SSH probes, passive capture and an in-network collector, and parses exports from Kubernetes, cloud and VPN configurations.
- TEC in the knowledge base. Kavach Copilot answers questions from the verbatim text of TEC, DST/NQM and CERT-In guidance.
- Hardware and firmware. Signed HBOMs record the network equipment and firmware you declare, alongside the CBOM.
- Self-hosted. Deploy in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped; KavachQ stores none of your keys.