What IR 8547 is
NIST Internal Report 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, is NIST's plan for moving from today's public-key algorithms to the post-quantum standards. It names the quantum-vulnerable algorithms in existing NIST standards, names their replacements, and sets the dates after which the old ones lose their approved status.[1]
The final version was published on 27 October 2026. It replaces the initial public draft of 12 November 2024, which NIST has now marked as withdrawn.[2][3] Its stated audience is federal agencies, technology providers, standards organisations and the laboratories that test cryptographic modules for FIPS 140 validation.[1]
The headline: deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035
NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow it under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035.[1] That covers both digital signatures (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA) and key establishment (finite-field and elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman and MQV, and RSA key establishment).
Key size does not change the answer. RSA-3072 on a payments API is on the same schedule as RSA-2048, and ECDSA P-384 is on the same schedule as P-256.
| Family | Standard | Parameters covered | Deprecated | Disallowed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ECDSA (signature) | FIPS 186 | ≥ 112 bits classical strength | After 2030 | After 2035 |
| EdDSA (signature) | FIPS 186 | ≥ 128 bits classical strength | After 2030 | After 2035 |
| RSA (signature) | FIPS 186 | ≥ 112 bits classical strength | After 2030 | After 2035 |
| Finite-field DH and MQV | SP 800-56A | ≥ 112 bits classical strength | After 2030 | After 2035 |
| Elliptic-curve DH and MQV | SP 800-56A | ≥ 112 bits classical strength | After 2030 | After 2035 |
| RSA key establishment | SP 800-56B | ≥ 112 bits classical strength | After 2030 | After 2035 |
What “deprecated” and “disallowed” mean
IR 8547 reuses the status terms from SP 800-131A, NIST's document on algorithm and key-length transitions.[1]
- Deprecated: the algorithm may still be used, but there is some security risk. The data owner must look at that risk and decide whether to keep using it.
- Disallowed: the algorithm or parameter set is no longer allowed for the stated purpose.
- Legacy use: it may only process data that is already protected, for example to decrypt old ciphertext or verify an old signature.
NIST says it will revise SP 800-131A with more detailed schedules during the transition.[1] Application-specific guidance, such as the next revision of SP 800-52 for TLS, may require or recommend earlier moves to post-quantum key establishment because of “harvest now, decrypt later” risk.[1]
What changed from the 2024 draft
The biggest change is for higher-strength keys. In the draft, only 112-bit parameters (such as RSA-2048 or P-224) were to be deprecated after 2030. Parameters of 128 bits and above stayed acceptable until they were disallowed after 2035.[3] The final deprecates all of them after 2030.[1]
| Topic | Initial public draft (Nov 2024) | Final (Oct 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| ≥ 128-bit RSA/ECC (e.g. RSA-3072, P-256) | Disallowed after 2035; no 2030 deprecation | Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035 |
| US policy anchor | NSM-10 goal of 2035 | NSM-10 2035 goal kept, plus EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15 deadlines for the most sensitive systems |
| Default ML-KEM parameter set | Not stated | ML-KEM-768 recommended as the default |
| HQC | Fourth round still evaluating KEMs | HQC selected; its FIPS is under development |
| Hybrid key derivation (SP 800-56C) | Z‖T combination | Order may also be reversed (T‖Z); to be set at protocol level |
The replacements
Three post-quantum standards were finalised on 13 August 2024.[4]
- FIPS 203, ML-KEM for key establishment. NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default parameter set and allows others where that is impractical or higher security is needed.[1]
- FIPS 204, ML-DSA for general-purpose signatures (ML-DSA-44, -65, -87).[1]
- FIPS 205, SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based signature.[1]
- SP 800-208, LMS/HSS and XMSS, stateful hash-based signatures. NIST says they are not meant for general use but may suit software and firmware signing.[1]
Two more standards are still coming and have not been published. A FIPS for a signature algorithm derived from FALCON (FN-DSA) is in development, and so is a FIPS for the HQC key-encapsulation mechanism.[1][5] Do not plan around their parameters yet. For a deeper look, see FIPS 203, 204 and 205.
Hybrid is allowed, not required
NIST leaves it to each application to decide whether hybrid key establishment or dual signatures are worth the extra complexity. It will accept them in FIPS 140 validation when they are combined with a NIST-approved scheme.[1] A hybrid TLS group such as X25519MLKEM768 can therefore sit inside a validated module, because the ML-KEM input is approved.
Symmetric keys and hashes
NIST does not expect to move away from its symmetric standards as part of this migration. Approved symmetric primitives with at least 128 bits of classical security are believed to meet at least post-quantum security category 1.[1] Two exceptions are worth noting:
- The few symmetric standards at the 112-bit level “will be disallowed in 2030”.[1]
- SHA-1 is already deprecated and will be disallowed in FIPS-validated modules after 2030.[1]
AES-256 and SHA-512 sit in category 5, the highest. SHA-384 is category 5 for preimage resistance and category 4 for collision resistance.[1]
How it lines up with US federal deadlines
IR 8547 supports Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15. As IR 8547 summarises them, federal high-value assets and high-impact systems must use post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031. Under EO 14306 and OMB M-26-15, agencies must also support TLS 1.3 by 2 January 2030.[1] NIST is clear that its 2030–2035 window does not move those earlier dates.[1] See our US region page for the wider policy picture.
| Date | What happens | Applies to |
|---|---|---|
| 13 Aug 2024 | FIPS 203, 204 and 205 published | Everyone using NIST standards |
| 27 Oct 2026 | IR 8547 final published | Planning reference |
| 2 Jan 2030 | TLS 1.3 support required | US federal agencies |
| 2030 | 112-bit symmetric standards disallowed | NIST standards |
| 31 Dec 2030 | Post-quantum key establishment | US federal high-value and high-impact systems |
| After 2030 | RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, ECDH, MQV deprecated; SHA-1 disallowed in FIPS-validated modules | NIST standards and FIPS validation |
| 31 Dec 2031 | Post-quantum digital signatures | US federal high-value and high-impact systems |
| After 2035 | Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms disallowed | NIST standards and guidelines |
Why this matters outside the US
IR 8547 binds US federal use, not an Indian bank or a Gulf insurer. It still reaches them in three practical ways.
- Validated modules. Many HSMs and crypto libraries are sold with FIPS 140-3 validation. The validation programme follows NIST's approval status, and IR 8547 lists the testing laboratories among its audience.[1]
- Vendor roadmaps. Global vendors that sell to US agencies are building to these dates. Their products, and their end-of-support notices, will follow.
- Local guidance points to NIST. CERT-In's v2.0 technical guidelines ask that CBOM and QBOM practices align with standards including NIST's post-quantum standards.[6]
For Indian BFSI context, see NIST FIPS PQC for Indian BFSI and the India roadmap.
Deprecated after 2030 does not mean safe until 2030. Data encrypted today with RSA or ECDH key exchange can be recorded now and decrypted later. NIST names this “harvest now, decrypt later” threat as a main reason the transition is urgent.[1]
What to do this year
NIST says organisations should start with cryptographic inventories, migration planning and early deployments.[1] A cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) is the inventory in a structured form.
- Build the CBOM. Record each algorithm, key size, protocol and certificate, and where it is used. CERT-In's Table 9 lists minimum elements for each cryptographic asset.[6] See how to find weak cryptography.
- Tag each entry with its IR 8547 status. Mark RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH and ECDH entries as “deprecated after 2030”. Mark SHA-1 and 112-bit symmetric uses for removal by 2030.
- Rank by data lifetime. Fix key exchange on long-lived confidential data first. Use Mosca's inequality to set the order.
- Ask vendors for dates. Request ML-KEM and ML-DSA support dates and FIPS 140-3 plans in writing. See PQC procurement requirements.
- Pilot hybrid TLS. Try ML-KEM in TLS 1.3 on one external endpoint, and record the change in the CBOM.
How KavachQ helps
KavachQ turns the IR 8547 dates into work you can schedule:
- Discover inventories the RSA, elliptic-curve and finite-field cryptography in use and gives each asset a T1–T4 quantum-risk tier.
- NIST IR 8547 is one of 14 opt-in framework packs: turn it on and the estate is mapped to it, with the gaps listed.
- Migrate builds a P0/P1/P2 plan with a target algorithm per asset, against DST/NQM deadlines harmonised with global ones.
See how the pieces fit on the platform page.