GuidePQCNIST IR 8547

NIST IR 8547: what is deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035

NIST published the final version of IR 8547 on 27 October 2026. It sets one schedule for every quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithm: deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035, whatever the key size. This guide sets out the dates, the replacements and what to do with a CBOM now.

8 min readReviewed 8 November 20266 sources

What IR 8547 is

NIST Internal Report 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, is NIST's plan for moving from today's public-key algorithms to the post-quantum standards. It names the quantum-vulnerable algorithms in existing NIST standards, names their replacements, and sets the dates after which the old ones lose their approved status.[1]

The final version was published on 27 October 2026. It replaces the initial public draft of 12 November 2024, which NIST has now marked as withdrawn.[2][3] Its stated audience is federal agencies, technology providers, standards organisations and the laboratories that test cryptographic modules for FIPS 140 validation.[1]

The headline: deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035

NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography after 2030 and disallow it under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035.[1] That covers both digital signatures (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA) and key establishment (finite-field and elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman and MQV, and RSA key establishment).

Key size does not change the answer. RSA-3072 on a payments API is on the same schedule as RSA-2048, and ECDSA P-384 is on the same schedule as P-256.

FamilyStandardParameters coveredDeprecatedDisallowed
ECDSA (signature)FIPS 186≥ 112 bits classical strengthAfter 2030After 2035
EdDSA (signature)FIPS 186≥ 128 bits classical strengthAfter 2030After 2035
RSA (signature)FIPS 186≥ 112 bits classical strengthAfter 2030After 2035
Finite-field DH and MQVSP 800-56A≥ 112 bits classical strengthAfter 2030After 2035
Elliptic-curve DH and MQVSP 800-56A≥ 112 bits classical strengthAfter 2030After 2035
RSA key establishmentSP 800-56B≥ 112 bits classical strengthAfter 2030After 2035
Figure 1 · Quantum-vulnerable algorithms and their transition dates. Source: NIST IR 8547 (final), Tables 2 and 4 [1].

What “deprecated” and “disallowed” mean

IR 8547 reuses the status terms from SP 800-131A, NIST's document on algorithm and key-length transitions.[1]

  • Deprecated: the algorithm may still be used, but there is some security risk. The data owner must look at that risk and decide whether to keep using it.
  • Disallowed: the algorithm or parameter set is no longer allowed for the stated purpose.
  • Legacy use: it may only process data that is already protected, for example to decrypt old ciphertext or verify an old signature.

NIST says it will revise SP 800-131A with more detailed schedules during the transition.[1] Application-specific guidance, such as the next revision of SP 800-52 for TLS, may require or recommend earlier moves to post-quantum key establishment because of “harvest now, decrypt later” risk.[1]

What changed from the 2024 draft

The biggest change is for higher-strength keys. In the draft, only 112-bit parameters (such as RSA-2048 or P-224) were to be deprecated after 2030. Parameters of 128 bits and above stayed acceptable until they were disallowed after 2035.[3] The final deprecates all of them after 2030.[1]

TopicInitial public draft (Nov 2024)Final (Oct 2026)
≥ 128-bit RSA/ECC (e.g. RSA-3072, P-256)Disallowed after 2035; no 2030 deprecationDeprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035
US policy anchorNSM-10 goal of 2035NSM-10 2035 goal kept, plus EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15 deadlines for the most sensitive systems
Default ML-KEM parameter setNot statedML-KEM-768 recommended as the default
HQCFourth round still evaluating KEMsHQC selected; its FIPS is under development
Hybrid key derivation (SP 800-56C)Z‖T combinationOrder may also be reversed (T‖Z); to be set at protocol level
Figure 2 · Main differences between the draft and final IR 8547. Sources: [1], [3].

The replacements

Three post-quantum standards were finalised on 13 August 2024.[4]

  • FIPS 203, ML-KEM for key establishment. NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default parameter set and allows others where that is impractical or higher security is needed.[1]
  • FIPS 204, ML-DSA for general-purpose signatures (ML-DSA-44, -65, -87).[1]
  • FIPS 205, SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based signature.[1]
  • SP 800-208, LMS/HSS and XMSS, stateful hash-based signatures. NIST says they are not meant for general use but may suit software and firmware signing.[1]

Two more standards are still coming and have not been published. A FIPS for a signature algorithm derived from FALCON (FN-DSA) is in development, and so is a FIPS for the HQC key-encapsulation mechanism.[1][5] Do not plan around their parameters yet. For a deeper look, see FIPS 203, 204 and 205.

Hybrid is allowed, not required

NIST leaves it to each application to decide whether hybrid key establishment or dual signatures are worth the extra complexity. It will accept them in FIPS 140 validation when they are combined with a NIST-approved scheme.[1] A hybrid TLS group such as X25519MLKEM768 can therefore sit inside a validated module, because the ML-KEM input is approved.

Symmetric keys and hashes

NIST does not expect to move away from its symmetric standards as part of this migration. Approved symmetric primitives with at least 128 bits of classical security are believed to meet at least post-quantum security category 1.[1] Two exceptions are worth noting:

  • The few symmetric standards at the 112-bit level “will be disallowed in 2030”.[1]
  • SHA-1 is already deprecated and will be disallowed in FIPS-validated modules after 2030.[1]

AES-256 and SHA-512 sit in category 5, the highest. SHA-384 is category 5 for preimage resistance and category 4 for collision resistance.[1]

How it lines up with US federal deadlines

IR 8547 supports Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15. As IR 8547 summarises them, federal high-value assets and high-impact systems must use post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031. Under EO 14306 and OMB M-26-15, agencies must also support TLS 1.3 by 2 January 2030.[1] NIST is clear that its 2030–2035 window does not move those earlier dates.[1] See our US region page for the wider policy picture.

DateWhat happensApplies to
13 Aug 2024FIPS 203, 204 and 205 publishedEveryone using NIST standards
27 Oct 2026IR 8547 final publishedPlanning reference
2 Jan 2030TLS 1.3 support requiredUS federal agencies
2030112-bit symmetric standards disallowedNIST standards
31 Dec 2030Post-quantum key establishmentUS federal high-value and high-impact systems
After 2030RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, ECDH, MQV deprecated; SHA-1 disallowed in FIPS-validated modulesNIST standards and FIPS validation
31 Dec 2031Post-quantum digital signaturesUS federal high-value and high-impact systems
After 2035Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms disallowedNIST standards and guidelines
Figure 3 · Key IR 8547 and US federal dates. Sources: [1], [4].

Why this matters outside the US

IR 8547 binds US federal use, not an Indian bank or a Gulf insurer. It still reaches them in three practical ways.

  • Validated modules. Many HSMs and crypto libraries are sold with FIPS 140-3 validation. The validation programme follows NIST's approval status, and IR 8547 lists the testing laboratories among its audience.[1]
  • Vendor roadmaps. Global vendors that sell to US agencies are building to these dates. Their products, and their end-of-support notices, will follow.
  • Local guidance points to NIST. CERT-In's v2.0 technical guidelines ask that CBOM and QBOM practices align with standards including NIST's post-quantum standards.[6]

For Indian BFSI context, see NIST FIPS PQC for Indian BFSI and the India roadmap.

NOT A DEADLINE TO WAIT FOR

Deprecated after 2030 does not mean safe until 2030. Data encrypted today with RSA or ECDH key exchange can be recorded now and decrypted later. NIST names this “harvest now, decrypt later” threat as a main reason the transition is urgent.[1]

What to do this year

NIST says organisations should start with cryptographic inventories, migration planning and early deployments.[1] A cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) is the inventory in a structured form.

  1. Build the CBOM. Record each algorithm, key size, protocol and certificate, and where it is used. CERT-In's Table 9 lists minimum elements for each cryptographic asset.[6] See how to find weak cryptography.
  2. Tag each entry with its IR 8547 status. Mark RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH and ECDH entries as “deprecated after 2030”. Mark SHA-1 and 112-bit symmetric uses for removal by 2030.
  3. Rank by data lifetime. Fix key exchange on long-lived confidential data first. Use Mosca's inequality to set the order.
  4. Ask vendors for dates. Request ML-KEM and ML-DSA support dates and FIPS 140-3 plans in writing. See PQC procurement requirements.
  5. Pilot hybrid TLS. Try ML-KEM in TLS 1.3 on one external endpoint, and record the change in the CBOM.

How KavachQ helps

KavachQ turns the IR 8547 dates into work you can schedule:

  • Discover inventories the RSA, elliptic-curve and finite-field cryptography in use and gives each asset a T1–T4 quantum-risk tier.
  • NIST IR 8547 is one of 14 opt-in framework packs: turn it on and the estate is mapped to it, with the gaps listed.
  • Migrate builds a P0/P1/P2 plan with a target algorithm per asset, against DST/NQM deadlines harmonised with global ones.

See how the pieces fit on the platform page.

Frequently asked questions

Is NIST IR 8547 final?

Yes. NIST published the final version of IR 8547 on 27 October 2026. It replaces the initial public draft released on 12 November 2024, which NIST has marked as withdrawn.

When will RSA and ECC be disallowed by NIST?

Under IR 8547, quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, including RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA and Diffie-Hellman variants, are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards after 2035. This applies at every key size, so RSA-3072 and P-384 are on the same schedule as RSA-2048 and P-256.

What is the difference between deprecated and disallowed in NIST terms?

In SP 800-131A language, a deprecated algorithm may still be used, but there is some security risk and the data owner must decide whether to accept it. A disallowed algorithm is no longer allowed for the stated purpose. Legacy use means it can only process data that is already protected, such as verifying an old signature.

Does NIST IR 8547 apply to Indian banks?

Not directly; it governs US federal use of NIST standards. It matters in practice because FIPS 140-3 validated modules and global vendor roadmaps follow NIST's approval status, and CERT-In's technical guidelines ask that CBOM and QBOM practices align with NIST post-quantum standards.

Does IR 8547 require hybrid post-quantum TLS?

No. NIST leaves the choice of hybrid key establishment to each application. It will accept hybrid modes in FIPS 140 validation when one component is a NIST-approved scheme such as ML-KEM.

Sources

  1. NIST, IR 8547 Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, final (October 2026) — nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf
  2. NIST CSRC, NIST IR 8547 publication page (October 2026) — csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8547/final
  3. NIST, IR 8547 initial public draft, withdrawn (November 2024) — nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2024/NIST.IR.8547.ipd.pdf
  4. NIST CSRC, FIPS publications list (accessed November 2026) — csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips
  5. NIST CSRC, Post-Quantum Cryptography project (accessed November 2026) — csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
  6. CERT-In, Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM, v2.0 (July 2025) — cert-in.org.in/PDF/TechnicalGuidelines-on-SBOM,QBOM&CBOM,AIBOM_and_HBOM_ver2.0.pdf

Sources checked 8 November 2026. Standards and regulations change; always read the issuing body's current publication. This guide is general information, not legal advice.

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