What CNSA 2.0 is
The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0) is the US National Security Agency's (NSA's) set of public algorithms for protecting US National Security Systems (NSS). It replaces Suite B and CNSA 1.0. NSA says that any use of those older suites must move to CNSA 2.0, in new designs and in equipment already in the field.[1]
NSA's main guidance is its CNSA 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ. The current version is 2.2, from October 2026. It sets out CNSA 2.0 requirements for NSS and gives recommended guidance for the Department of War and the Defense Industrial Base.[1] Equipment already in use must also be upgraded unless it has a waiver. NSA describes this as consistent with NSPM-12 (12 June 2026), NSM-10, CNSSP 11 and CNSSP 15.[1]
The algorithm suite
CNSA 2.0 sets one strength level and keeps to it. For general-purpose public-key work, it allows only the highest NIST parameter sets.
| Use | Algorithm | Standard | CNSA 2.0 parameters |
|---|---|---|---|
| General: symmetric encryption | AES | FIPS 197 | 256-bit keys, all classification levels |
| General: key establishment | ML-KEM | FIPS 203 | ML-KEM-1024 |
| General: digital signatures | ML-DSA | FIPS 204 | ML-DSA-87, for any use case, including firmware and software signing |
| General: hashing | SHA-2 | FIPS 180-4 | SHA-384 or SHA-512 |
| Specific: firmware and software signing | LMS and XMSS | SP 800-208 | All parameters approved; LMS SHA-256/192 recommended |
| Specific: internal hardware functions only (e.g. boot-up integrity checks) | SHA-3 | FIPS 202 | SHA3-384 or SHA3-512 |
Three points stand out:
- Bigger RSA or ECC keys do not help. Asked whether larger RSA or ECC keys can still be used, the FAQ answers “No”. RSA and ECC are the main algorithms that need replacing.[1]
- Signatures have two routes. ML-DSA-87 can sign anything, including firmware. Stateful hash-based signatures (LMS, XMSS) are allowed for firmware and software signing.[1]
- Some NIST algorithms are not listed. SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) is not in the suite, and neither are ML-KEM-512 or -768.[1]
The IETF profiles now in RFC Editor processing turn this into protocol settings. The TLS 1.3 profile names ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87 and TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.[2]
The timeline
NSA intends every NSS to be quantum-resistant well before the 2035 goal set by NSM-10. The update to CNSSP 15 sets three dates.[1]
| Date | What happens |
|---|---|
| 1 January 2027 | CNSA 2.0 algorithms are required in all new NSS acquisitions. NSA expects new deployments to comply, unless a profile explicitly says otherwise. |
| 31 December 2030 | Equipment and services that cannot run CNSA 2.0 are phased out, unless granted an exception. NSA also expects encryption to be broadly quantum-resistant by default by this date. |
| 31 December 2031 | CNSA 2.0 algorithms become mandatory, unless otherwise noted, so that NSS are fully quantum-resistant. |
| 2035 | NSM-10 goal for the overall US migration; NSA aims to finish well ahead of it. |
The FAQ separates partial from full quantum resistance. Partial means, for example, encryption is quantum-resistant before identity management is. Full means every cryptographic service is.[1] That is why there are two end dates: 2030 for equipment that cannot be upgraded, and 2031 for full use.
NSS will run CNSA 1.0 and CNSA 2.0 side by side for a long time. NSA asks owners to configure systems to prefer CNSA 2.0 first, and later to accept only CNSA 2.0.[1]
NSA's 2022 advisory set dates by equipment category, between 2025 and 2033. Many websites still quote that table. NSA's FAQ v2.2 now frames the timeline around 2027, 2030 and 2031[1], so plan against those dates.
If no compliant product exists by 2027
NSA allows a fallback. A product may still be accepted if the vendor commits in the contract to a CNSA 2.0 update, and there is a realistic plan that puts partial quantum resistance first and reaches full quantum resistance by the 2030 deadline.[1] NSA warns that firmware update options likely cannot be changed after purchase, so check them before buying. NIAP (the National Information Assurance Partnership) is updating its Protection Profiles. Products certified before 2027 will need revalidation before the end of the decade. NIAP expects to start archiving certificates for partially quantum-resistant and quantum-vulnerable products in late 2027.[1]
The stance on hybrids
NSA will not require NSS developers to use hybrid certified products for security purposes. It accepts that product availability and interoperability may lead to hybrids in specific cases.[1] Two caveats follow.
- Where NSA has published guidance on a hybrid, only the hybrid solution it identified counts as “CNSA 2.0 compliant”.[1]
- Something marketed as hybrid or composite is not necessarily quantum-resistant. Hybrids also add complexity, raise interoperability concerns and lead to a second transition later.[1]
The IETF SSH profile states the pure-PQC position directly: any algorithm other than ML-KEM-1024 “MUST NOT be negotiated for key exchange” in a CNSA-compliant connection.[3] A hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 can be a sound choice on the public internet. It is not a CNSA 2.0 configuration, because its ML-KEM part is -768.
How it differs from NIST IR 8547
| Topic | NIST IR 8547 | CNSA 2.0 |
|---|---|---|
| Who it binds | Federal use of NIST standards, for information other than national-security information | US National Security Systems |
| Key establishment | ML-KEM-512, -768 or -1024; ML-KEM-768 recommended as default | ML-KEM-1024 only |
| Signatures | ML-DSA (all sets), SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS | ML-DSA-87; LMS/XMSS for firmware and software |
| Hybrid | Accommodated, including in FIPS 140 validation | Not required; only NSA-identified hybrids count as compliant |
| Key dates | Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035 | New acquisitions 1 Jan 2027; phase-out 31 Dec 2030; full use 31 Dec 2031 |
CNSA 2.0 is narrower, stricter and earlier. A product that meets it will usually also meet the NIST schedule, but the reverse does not hold. A system using ML-KEM-768 complies with NIST but not with CNSA 2.0. For the NIST side, see NIST IR 8547.
Why it matters outside the US
NSA is clear about the limits. It encourages CNSA 2.0 in standards and vendor products, “but it is not an NSA requirement beyond NSS”.[1] It still reaches further in practice:
- Vendors. The FAQ's audience includes industry and vendors that sell to NSS.[1] Network, HSM and operating-system vendors building for the 2027 acquisition date often ship the same product line worldwide.
- Defence supply chains. The FAQ gives guidance for the Defense Industrial Base. It says it may also help anyone who interacts with NSS, Department of War or Defense Industrial Base systems.[1]
- A benchmark. NSA says the FAQ is also useful for any organisation seeking similar robust security and interoperability requirements.[1]
Using a CBOM to show progress
The CNSA 2.0 dates depend on what a system can support and what it actually uses. A cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) records both.
- Record exact parameters, not just families. “ML-KEM” cannot tell -768 from -1024, and “SHA-2” cannot tell SHA-256 from SHA-384.
- Mark each asset's state: quantum-vulnerable, partially quantum-resistant, CNSA 2.0 preferred, or CNSA 2.0 only. These states line up with the FAQ's partial and full quantum-resistance milestones.
- Flag assets that cannot be upgraded. These must be phased out or covered by an exception by 31 December 2030.
- Track signing separately. Record the firmware and software signing algorithm (ML-DSA-87, LMS or XMSS) and where signing keys are held.
- Keep evidence. Attach vendor commitments, update plans and certificates to each entry. See vendor CBOM declarations and how to validate a CBOM.
How KavachQ helps
If you supply US national security systems, or sell to those who do, KavachQ helps you show where you stand:
- CNSA 2.0 is one of 14 opt-in framework packs: the estate is mapped to it, with the gaps listed.
- Discover records algorithms and parameter sets in a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM, so you can see what falls short of the CNSA 2.0 suite.
- Seal signs that CBOM with ML-DSA-65 (KavachQ's own signature; CNSA 2.0 itself specifies ML-DSA-87), so a customer can check it offline against the signing key's published fingerprint.