ResearchMeasurementIndia

Post-quantum TLS on India's digital public services

Does connecting to India's digital public services today use post-quantum key exchange? We measured 20 of them on 8 November 2026. 3 of the 16 we could reach do. Here are the results, service by service, with the method and raw data.

5 min readReviewed 8 November 20263 sources

What we measured

On 8 November 2026 we ran one automated scan, a short series of read-only TLS handshakes, against the main public host of 20 Indian digital public services and government portals: identity, health, tax, social security, transport, procurement and e-services. It is the same check as KavachQ's free scan, which reads only what a server negotiates publicly[1]. None of these services is in our BFSI Readiness Index, which covers 66 banks, insurers, NBFCs, payment rails and financial regulators[2].

The question is narrow: when a browser connects today, does the session use a hybrid post-quantum key exchange that protects it against harvest-now-decrypt-later? It says nothing about the systems behind the front door.

The headline

3 of the 16 services we could measure negotiate a hybrid post-quantum key exchange (ABHA, UMANG and NIC website), using X25519MLKEM768. 10 negotiated classical key exchange (x25519), and 3 offered only TLS 1.2 to our scanner, where hybrid post-quantum key exchange is not available. Traffic recorded from a classical session today could be decrypted later by a quantum computer able to break elliptic-curve key exchange. For comparison, 28 of the 66 financial institutions in our BFSI index negotiated hybrid key exchange when we measured them on 26 August 2026[2].

  • 3 services offered only TLS 1.2 to our scanner (Income Tax e-filing, GST portal and Passport Seva). Hybrid post-quantum key exchange for TLS is defined for TLS 1.3[3], so these cannot offer it until they move.
  • 3 services still accept static-RSA cipher suites (UIDAI website, MyGov and IRCTC). These give no forward secrecy: if the server's private key ever leaks, recorded sessions that used these suites can be decrypted with no quantum computer at all. Browsers that support TLS 1.3 will not use them, but older TLS 1.2 clients can.
  • Every certificate is classical: 13 use RSA-2048 keys and 3 use ECDSA P-256 keys. That is expected. Browser-trusted certificate authorities do not issue post-quantum certificates yet, so the key exchange is the part an operator can upgrade today.

Results by service

ServiceHostKey exchangeTLSStatic-RSA suitesCertificate key
ABHA (Ayushman Bharat Health Account)abha.abdm.gov.inHybrid post-quantum (X25519MLKEM768)1.2, 1.30RSA-2048
NIC websitewww.nic.inHybrid post-quantum (X25519MLKEM768)1.2, 1.30RSA-2048
UMANGweb.umang.gov.inHybrid post-quantum (X25519MLKEM768)1.30RSA-2048
Central Public Procurement Portaleprocure.gov.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.30RSA-2048
DigiLockerdigilocker.gov.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.30RSA-2048
EPFO member portalunifiedportal-mem.epfindia.gov.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.30RSA-2048
IRCTCirctc.co.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.35RSA-2048
MyGovmygov.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.35RSA-2048
National Portal of Indiaindia.gov.inClassical (x25519)1.30ECDSA P-256
ONDCondc.orgClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.30ECDSA P-256
Parivahanparivahan.gov.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.30ECDSA P-256
TRAItrai.gov.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.30RSA-2048
UIDAI websiteuidai.gov.inClassical (x25519)1.2, 1.35RSA-2048
GST portalservices.gst.gov.inNot available (TLS 1.2 only)1.20RSA-2048
Income Tax e-filingeportal.incometax.gov.inNot available (TLS 1.2 only)1.20RSA-2048
Passport Sevapassportindia.gov.inNot available (TLS 1.2 only)1.20RSA-2048
Figure 1 · One scan per host on 8 November 2026. Raw observations, without scores: measurements.json.

We could not measure 4 services. That does not mean they are insecure: their servers did not complete a handshake with our scanner, which can happen when a site filters traffic by location or client.

  • myAadhaar portal (myaadhaar.uidai.gov.in): no TLS handshake completed with our scanner
  • Government e-Marketplace (GeM) (gem.gov.in): no TLS handshake completed with our scanner
  • PM-KISAN (pmkisan.gov.in): no TLS handshake completed with our scanner
  • MeitY (meity.gov.in): no TLS handshake completed with our scanner

Method and limits

  • One automated scan per host, from KavachQ's scanner, on 8 November 2026: a few read-only handshakes, including a post-quantum probe and a TLS 1.2 cipher-suite check. Results can change at any time, and a single sample can be affected by load balancing.
  • We measure the public front door only. Many sites terminate TLS at a content delivery network; the connection from there to the origin, and every internal system, are out of scope.
  • "Hybrid post-quantum" means the server chose a hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 for a browser-like client. It protects the session's key exchange, not the certificate.
  • NIC was measured at www.nic.in, because nic.in itself has no address record.
  • We chose services by public reach, not by risk. This is a snapshot, not a ranking or an audit.

What operators can do now

  1. Enable TLS 1.3 everywhere and turn on the hybrid X25519MLKEM768 group. On many CDNs and modern TLS libraries this is a configuration change. See hybrid PQC TLS explained.
  2. Remove static-RSA cipher suites. They are a present-day risk, quantum or not. See finding weak cryptography.
  3. Look behind the front door: build a cryptographic inventory of the systems these portals depend on. See what a CBOM is and the government and CII page.

How KavachQ helps

Run the same check on any public domain with the free scan. For the systems behind the front door, KavachQ Discover inventories cryptography across code, configuration, keystores and internal networks, and produces a signed CBOM.

Frequently asked questions

Which Indian government websites use post-quantum TLS?

In our measurement on 8 November 2026, ABHA, UMANG and NIC website negotiated hybrid post-quantum key exchange (X25519MLKEM768). The other services we could reach used classical key exchange, or offered only TLS 1.2.

Does a post-quantum key exchange make a website quantum-safe?

No. It protects the session key against harvest-now-decrypt-later, which is the most urgent part. Certificates are still classical, and the systems behind the website need their own migration.

How can I check a website myself?

Use KavachQ's free scan at kavachq.in/scan. It runs the same read-only checks used in this report and shows the key exchange, TLS versions, certificate and weak options.

Why could some services not be measured?

Their servers did not complete a TLS handshake with our scanner. Sites often filter traffic by location or client, so this says nothing about their security.

Sources

  1. KavachQ, raw measurements for this report (8 November 2026) — kavachq.in/data/dpi-index/measurements.json
  2. KavachQ, India BFSI Post-Quantum Readiness Index (measured 26 August 2026) — kavachq.in/pqc-index
  3. IETF, RFC 10024: Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3 (August 2026) — www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024

Sources checked 8 November 2026. Standards and regulations change; always read the issuing body's current publication. This guide is general information, not legal advice.

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