Insurers hold some of the longest-lived personal data in the economy. A life policy can run for decades, and health and claims records stay sensitive for as long as the person is alive. Data like this is what "harvest now, decrypt later" attackers want: they record encrypted traffic or copy encrypted archives today and wait for a quantum computer able to break the public-key cryptography that protects it. This page sets out what IRDAI now asks for, where the cryptography sits in an insurer, and what to do in the next two quarters.
What your regulators expect
IRDAI has not issued a PQC migration mandate or deadline. Since April 2026, however, its cyber security audit asks whether you keep an up-to-date cryptographic inventory to prepare for post-quantum cryptography (PQC). That makes the inventory an audit question now, not a future one.
IRDAI Information and Cyber Security Guidelines, 2026 (6 April 2026)
On 6 April 2026 IRDAI issued revised guidelines (circular IRDAI/GA&HR/CIR/MISC/51/4/2026). They revise the guidelines issued on 24 April 2023 and "set out the minimum standards and governance mechanisms to be adopted by all Regulated Entities"[1]. The circular says all of the following "shall strictly adhere" to the guidelines from the current financial year:
- insurers, including foreign reinsurance branches;
- brokers and corporate agents;
- web aggregators;
- TPAs (third-party administrators);
- insurance marketing firms and insurance repositories;
- insurance self-network platforms (ISNPs) and corporate surveyors;
- motor insurance service providers (MISPs) and common service centres (CSCs);
- the Insurance Information Bureau of India.
Three parts are directly relevant to post-quantum readiness.
- A new crypto-inventory audit control. IRDAI's summary of changes (Annexure A) lists a new control in the auditor's report. The Asset Management (ID.AM) section of the Annexure III questionnaire now asks: "Does the organization maintain an up-to-date inventory of its cryptographic assets to ensure preparedness for transition to post-quantum cryptographic environments?" The guidelines require an independent assurance audit every year[1].
- Cryptographic Controls policy (§2.12). This section covers cryptography for data in transit and at rest. It requires a risk assessment of where encryption is used and a key-management policy covering keys "through their whole lifecycle". It says the type and strength of algorithms "shall be based on the criticality of the business information handled", and that key lengths "shall comply with contractual requirements and regulations laid down by competent authorities"[1].
- Supply-chain controls (ID.SC). The audit asks whether vendors follow the insurer's cyber security policy, whether third parties are assessed periodically, and whether contracts (SLAs) require prior written permission before a provider outsources further. It also asks whether cloud providers are MeitY-empanelled with a valid STQC audit status[1].
The new control asks whether an inventory exists and is kept current. It does not set algorithms, a CBOM (cryptographic bill of materials) format or a migration date. The guidelines also have no quantum-specific requirement beyond this question.
DST / National Quantum Mission roadmap (May 2026). This is advisory.
The DST task-force report includes Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) among the critical information infrastructure (CII) sectors on accelerated timelines[2]:
- foundations by 31 December 2027;
- high-priority systems migrated by 31 December 2028;
- full PQC adoption by 31 December 2029.
It also says that "any network handling data with a long shelf life or extended confidentiality requirements shall be prioritised". It names personal health data and financial records as information that "must remain secure for long periods". The report calls its testing framework "a guiding document for the sectoral regulators", IRDAI among them. It advises asking vendors for CBOMs from FY 2026–27 and making them mandatory from FY 2027–28. None of this is an IRDAI requirement unless IRDAI adopts it.
CERT-In v2.0 (9 July 2025). This is technical guidance.
CERT-In's Technical Guidelines on SBOM, QBOM & CBOM, AIBOM and HBOM say organisations "must maintain an accurate and up-to-date CBOM/QBOM" for cryptographic systems they use, develop or procure (§8.4.1.3). They also recommend tiered PQC terms in vendor contracts (§8.5.4)[3]. For an insurer, this is the most detailed public description of what a cryptographic inventory should contain. That makes it a practical template for answering IRDAI's audit question.
Where the cryptography sits in an insurer
The table below shows typical patterns, not findings about any particular insurer. Rank them by how long the data must stay confidential, not only by system criticality.
| System | Cryptography typically in use | Why it matters for quantum migration | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Health claims and TPA links | Mutual TLS APIs, SFTP, file encryption with public keys, VPNs to TPAs | Health and claims data stays sensitive for decades, which makes it a prime harvest-now target; it crosses organisational boundaries | P0: longest shelf life, many parties |
| Data sharing with hospitals (cashless) | TLS portals and APIs, site-to-site VPNs, emailed or uploaded documents | Clinical documents travel over links you do not fully control | P0: inventory every link and owner |
| Agent, broker and aggregator portals | TLS with RSA or ECDSA certificates, signed SSO tokens, API keys | Internet-facing; many partners are themselves IRDAI-regulated and audited on a subset of the same controls, depending on their access to your systems | P0: public exposure |
| Customer portals and mobile apps | TLS, certificate pinning, app code signing, e-KYC integrations | Recorded sessions expose identity and policy data; pinned certificates make rotation slow | P0 for TLS; P1 for signing |
| Policy administration and core insurance platform | TLS between tiers, database and backup encryption, service certificates, vendor libraries | Holds the long-lived policy record; mostly vendor code, so you need the vendor's CBOM | P1: drive through vendor CBOMs |
| Digitally signed policy documents | RSA or ECDSA signatures and certificates | A signed policy may need to verify for its whole term; plan for re-signing or archive timestamping | P1: long validity |
| Payment gateways and premium collection | TLS to the gateway, signed callbacks, tokenisation | Mostly provider-managed; your migration follows the provider's roadmap | P1: ask providers for dated plans |
| Corporate network and remote access | IPsec or TLS VPNs, client certificates for devices | The guidelines require client certificates for hardware joining the trusted network; those are public-key credentials | P1: often tied to appliance refresh |
| Backups and archives | AES, with keys often wrapped under RSA in a key manager | Archives outlive systems; AES-256 holds up, but RSA key wrapping does not | P2: check key wrapping and AES-128 use |
Where to start
- Prepare evidence for the new audit question. Your next IRDAI audit can ask about a cryptographic inventory, so build one in a structured format rather than a spreadsheet of certificates. Start with a free public TLS scan of customer, agent and partner domains. Then follow how to find weak cryptography and the CBOM guide.
- Rank data by shelf life. Health, claims and life-policy data usually come first. The Mosca inequality and harvest-now-decrypt-later explainers show how to set the order.
- Extend the inventory to third parties. TPAs, brokers, web aggregators and cloud providers already sit inside IRDAI's supply-chain controls. Add CBOM and PQC-roadmap clauses to renewals using the PQC procurement requirements guide. Check what comes back against how to validate a CBOM.
- Anchor the plan to DST's CII dates. Map the inventory to the 2027 / 2028 / 2029 milestones on the India roadmap, so the board sees a dated plan, not only an audit answer.
- Benchmark against the sector. Compare with peers on the India BFSI PQC readiness index.
How KavachQ helps
- An inventory your auditor can check. KavachQ Discover builds the cryptographic inventory, and Seal signs it as a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM with ML-DSA-65, verifiable offline.
- Long-lived data first. Harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure and a Mosca timeline show which systems protect data that must stay confidential longest, such as policy and health records.
- IRDAI in the regulatory map. Findings are mapped to IRDAI alongside the other Indian regulators.
- Suppliers in view. Track which vendors block your migration, with a signed vendor scorecard for each.