What your regulators expect
SEBI's Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (CSCRF) was issued by circular SEBI/HO/ITD-1/ITD_CSC_EXT/P/CIR/2024/113 on 20 August 2024, under Section 11(1) of the SEBI Act[1]. It sorts regulated entities (REs) into five categories: Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs, such as exchanges, clearing corporations and depositories), Qualified REs, Mid-size REs, Small-size REs and Self-certification REs[1]. It already names post-quantum risk in several places.
Provisions of the CSCRF circular that touch cryptography
- Post-quantum risk assessment. Standard ID.RA.S2 requires periodic risk assessment "including post-quantum risks". The guideline sets the cadence: half-yearly for MIIs, yearly for Qualified and Mid-size REs[1].
- Encryption methods are part of the asset inventory. Standard ID.AM.S2: "Organizational communication, data flows and encryption methods shall be mapped and inventoried" for all IT systems and network resources[1].
- SBOMs that record encryption. Standard GV.SC.S5 requires SBOMs for critical systems, and lists "Encryption used" and "Cryptographic hash of the components" among the minimum SBOM contents. MIIs must include SBOM in their empanelment criteria for application software vendors[1]. SEBI's FAQs, which are clarifications rather than binding text, say this covers in-house as well as third-party software used for core and critical operations[2].
- Encryption everywhere. Data must be encrypted in motion, at rest and in use (in use for cloud deployments) with "industry standard, strong encryption algorithms (e.g., RSA, AES, etc.)"[1]. Note the tension: RSA is exactly what post-quantum migration replaces, which is why the inventory below matters. Digital certificates must be renewed "well in time"[1].
- Keys stay in India. SEBI's FAQs say encryption keys and key-management operations must be handled within India, and suggest Bring Your Own Key with cloud providers[2].
The quantum-specific box, and how SEBI has read it since
Box Item 7 of the CSCRF, "Cybersecurity and Quantum Computing", lists six "indicative measures" written with "shall": maintain an inventory of cryptographic assets prioritising critical assets for PQC migration; develop strategies for assets that can and cannot be migrated; run proof-of-concept trials; explore PQC and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); monitor developments; and enhance crypto-agility[1].
The June 2025 FAQs made the inventory concrete. It "shall describe what cryptography is used by which application for what purpose" and "shall include keys, certificates, algorithms, etc.", with PQC prioritisation based on risk assessment, asset criticality, data sensitivity and exposure[2]. SEBI's Annual Report 2025-26 describes this as directions requiring REs to maintain a comprehensive cryptographic asset inventory, assess PQC and QKD, enhance crypto-agility, monitor the ecosystem, and develop a roadmap with workforce upskilling. It also records awareness sessions for MIIs and other REs covering the Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM)[3].
In the SEBI documents we reviewed, there is no dated deadline for completing PQC migration and no list of mandated post-quantum algorithms. The national DST/NQM roadmap places BFSI with critical sectors on an accelerated, advisory timeline: foundations by 2027, high-priority migration by 2028, full adoption by 2029[4]. It also recommends that regulators, SEBI included, issue sector-specific guidance[4].
Banks that also act as custodians, depository participants or merchant bankers should read SEBI's August 2025 technical clarifications. They set out a "principle of exclusivity" and a "principle of equivalence" for REs supervised by more than one regulator[5].
Where the cryptography sits in a SEBI-regulated entity
The table below describes typical deployments, not any specific institution. "HNDL" is harvest now, decrypt later: an attacker records encrypted traffic today and decrypts it once a capable quantum computer exists.
| System | Cryptography typically in use | Why it matters for quantum migration | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Internet-based trading (IBT) web and mobile apps, investor portals | TLS with ECDHE key exchange; RSA or ECDSA server certificates; signed session tokens | Public-facing, high volume, carries PII and holdings. CSCRF makes TLS mandatory for sensitive web apps[1], so these endpoints define your external posture | P0: largest HNDL surface and easiest to measure |
| KYC, eSign and Aadhaar-linked onboarding; KRA uploads | RSA-based digital signatures and certificates; encrypted PII payloads | Identity data keeps its value for decades, and signatures must stay verifiable for years | P0: long shelf life, both confidentiality and signature exposure |
| Depository, clearing and RTA links | TLS or IPsec tunnels; PKI certificates; signed instruction files | Settlement integrity and long-lived holdings data; changes need coordinated cut-overs with counterparties | P0: long migration time because of counterparties |
| HSMs, PKI and key management | RSA and ECC root and issuing keys; RSA key-wrapping in KMS | Every other migration depends on them; HSM firmware and hardware refreshes take procurement cycles | P0: the critical path for everything else |
| Order gateways and exchange connectivity (leased line, internet, co-location) | IPsec or TLS VPNs; member certificates; sometimes no encryption on private circuits | Order data is short-lived, but sessions are latency-sensitive, so hybrid key exchange needs measurement first | P1: test before you change |
| Code signing and release pipelines (trading apps, algo binaries, empanelled COTS) | RSA or ECDSA code-signing certificates; signed update channels | SEBI flags "trust-now-forge-later"[3]: forged signatures, which for this system means forged updates. Vendor-dependent, so needs SBOM and contract levers | P1: plan with vendors now |
| Back office, fund accounting, data lake, backups | AES at rest (often AES-256), database encryption, keys wrapped by RSA | Symmetric data encryption is far less exposed; the public-key wrapping and backup retention are the risk | P1: check key-wrapping, not the AES |
| Remote access VPN, admin SSH | IKE or TLS with RSA/ECDH; SSH host and user keys | Privileged access paths; vendor upgrades usually available sooner | P1: follow vendor releases |
| Market data feeds | Often integrity-only or unencrypted multicast | Data is time-sensitive and largely public once disseminated | P2: low confidentiality value |
Where to start
The next two quarters can close the gap between what CSCRF already asks for and what most REs can show an auditor.
- Turn the ID.AM inventory into a cryptographic inventory. For each critical system, record algorithm, key, certificate, protocol and purpose, as the FAQ asks[2]. CERT-In's v2.0 guidelines give minimum elements per cryptographic asset in Table 9[6]; see the CBOM guide and how to find weak cryptography.
- Give the post-quantum risk assessment numbers. For each system, estimate data shelf life and migration time and compare them with a threat timeline. The Mosca inequality for Indian BFSI shows how, and harvest now, decrypt later explains why the IBT and KYC rows come first. Feed the result into your next ID.RA cycle.
- Ask vendors for cryptography, not just components. GV.SC.S5 already requires "Encryption used" in SBOMs[1]. Ask for a CBOM and a PQC roadmap in renewals and empanelment, and check what you receive: PQC procurement requirements and validating a CBOM.
- Baseline your internet-facing TLS, then pilot in non-production. Run a free public TLS scan on IBT and portal domains. Pilot hybrid key exchange on one low-risk service. CSCRF counts new security protocols (its example is moving to TLS 1.3) as a major change that triggers VAPT[1], so budget for that.
- Put HSM and PKI on the board's agenda. Box Item 7 asks for a strategy for assets that cannot be migrated[1]. Start with HSM refresh timing (HSM procurement for PQC) and map it against the India roadmap milestones.
How KavachQ helps
- SEBI CSCRF evidence map. KavachQ maps what the framework asks to see to where the evidence comes from in your estate.
- The cryptographic inventory, signed. Discover inventories keys, certificates and algorithms by application, and Seal signs the result as a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM verifiable offline.
- SBOMs for vendor empanelment. SBOMs in CycloneDX or SPDX 2.3, and other tools' SBOMs and CBOMs can be imported.
- Runs on your infrastructure. Deploy in your VPC, on-premises or air-gapped; KavachQ stores none of your keys.