N° 02Policy

Reading the Roadmap

The DST/NQM Task Force report is the document that turns "quantum is coming" into dated, advisory targets. Here is what it recommends — and for whom.

MILESTONES — CII VS. REGULAR ENTERPRISES 2027 2028 2030 2033 CII Power·Telecom Defence·ISRO M1 Foundation M2 Migrate M3 Full PQC Dec 27 Dec 28 Dec 29 REGULAR Non-CII banks NBFCs·insurers M1 Foundation M2 Migrate M3 Full PQC The report recommends vendor CBOM submission from FY 2027–28 — the gate everything else passes through.
CII runs one to four years ahead, finishing in 2029 rather than 2033. For BFSI, the relevant question is which row you sit in — and many institutions sit in both.

A national report on quantum cryptography could have been a survey of physics. This one is a programme-management document. Its central contribution is not explaining the threat — it is assigning dates, owners, and an order of operations. For anyone in Indian BFSI, those three things are the whole story.

Three milestones, two timetables

The report defines a three-stage migration and then runs it on two clocks depending on who you are.

  • Milestone 1 — Build the Foundations. Establish governance, complete discovery and inventory of cryptographic assets, run quantum risk analysis, adopt crypto-agility as a guiding principle, and begin requesting and then mandating CBOMs from vendors. CII: by 31 Dec 2027. Regular enterprises: by 31 Dec 2028.
  • Milestone 2 — Migrate High-Priority Systems. Convert pilots into funded programmes, enforce a strict "no new classical-only deployments" policy, deploy PQC-capable PKI and hybrid certificates, and upgrade HSMs, KMS and libraries. CII: by 31 Dec 2028. Regular: by 31 Dec 2030.
  • Milestone 3 — Full PQC Adoption. PQC becomes the default across all systems, classical-only trust chains are retired, and crypto-agility is institutionalised as ongoing practice. CII: by 31 Dec 2029. Regular: by 31 Dec 2033.

The compression for CII is deliberate. Critical Information Infrastructure — power, telecom, defence, and the financial-market plumbing that supports them — must finish in 2029 what other enterprises have until 2033 to complete.

The personas: the report's prioritisation logic

Rather than treating all organisations identically, the report sorts them into PQC Personas based on quantum-risk exposure, system longevity, and data sensitivity:

  • Urgent Adopters — critical infrastructure and high-risk operators (the report names Power, Telecom, ISRO, DRDO, ONGC). Accelerated timelines across every milestone.
  • Regular Adopters — moderate-risk enterprises following the baseline 2028 / 2030 / 2033 schedule.
  • Technology Providers & Enablers — vendors of cryptography-related products, expected to lead by example and support the broader ecosystem.

The crucial subtlety: an organisation can match more than one persona, and the highest-risk persona governs. A bank that also operates payment-switch infrastructure with long-lived keys does not get to claim the comfortable timeline. This single rule pulls a large slice of BFSI toward the urgent end of the spectrum.

The migration is not a technology upgrade. The report calls it a fundamental shift in digital trust — governed, funded, and audited like one.

CBOM as the universal gate

One instrument threads through every milestone: the Cryptographic Bill of Materials. From FY 2026–27 organisations are told to begin requesting CBOMs and quantum-resiliency roadmaps from vendors in procurement; the report recommends making CBOM submission a procurement requirement from FY 2027–28. This is the lever that propagates the entire programme through the supply chain — a bank cannot meet its obligations if its core-banking, payments and HSM vendors cannot produce a credible cryptographic inventory.

Assume-breach, and no new classical-only systems

Two principles in the report deserve to be quoted into every internal strategy deck. The first is assume-breach: plan as though HNDL adversaries are already capturing your traffic, because retrospective mitigation after Q-Day is impossible. The second arrives at Milestone 2 — a strict "no new classical-only deployments" policy. Read carefully, that obligation bites well before 2028: every procurement and architecture decision made now either adds to the migration backlog or doesn't. The cheapest quantum-safe migration is the classical system you never deploy in the first place.

What a bank should take from the document

Three things. First, find your row and your persona — and apply the highest-risk one honestly. Second, treat 2027 (not 2030) as the live deadline, because the foundation work is where the years go. Third, recognise that CBOM is the load-bearing deliverable: without an accurate cryptographic inventory, risk analysis, prioritisation, roadmap and vendor governance all rest on guesswork.

Where KavachQ fits · KavachQ Discover + KavachQ Migrate

The report's Milestone 1 is, almost line for line, what KavachQ Discover (assess) and KavachQ Migrate (roadmap) produce: a CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM, a quantum risk classification, and a prioritised, phased migration plan mapped to the 2027/2028/2029 target dates. It is purpose-built around this report's structure rather than retrofitted to it. → See N° 03 for what a CBOM contains, and N° 06 for the phased plan.