The short answer
A software bill of materials (SBOM) lists the software components inside a product. A cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) lists the cryptography that product actually uses: algorithms, keys, protocols and certificates, with the parameters that decide whether they are safe. One tells you that a payments service ships with a TLS library. The other tells you that the service negotiates TLS 1.2 with ECDHE and presents an RSA-2048 certificate.
For post-quantum migration you need the second answer. You also need the first, because the library version decides what you can switch to.
What an SBOM records
CERT-In's Technical Guidelines v2.0 set out the minimum elements of an SBOM in Table 5. The data fields are 21 per-component items: name, version, description, supplier, licence, origin, dependencies, vulnerabilities, patch status, release date, end-of-life date, criticality, usage restrictions, checksums or hashes, comments, author of SBOM data, timestamp, executable property, archive property, structured property and unique identifier. The table adds automation support (SPDX and CycloneDX formats) and practices such as frequency, depth and known unknowns.[1]
Only one of those fields is cryptographic, and it is not the one that matters for PQC: the checksum identifies the component; it does not describe the cryptography the component performs. An SBOM line such as openssl 3.0.13 tells you a general-purpose crypto library is present. It does not tell you which of its many algorithms are switched on, which key sizes are configured, or which certificates the service presents. Cryptography that never arrives as a package, such as an algorithm hard-coded in in-house code, a cipher list in a load-balancer configuration or a key exported from an HSM, does not appear at all.
What a CBOM records
CERT-In defines the CBOM as "an inventory of cryptographic assets—including algorithms, keys, protocols, certificates, and dependencies—capturing critical metadata such as usage patterns and expiration dates".[1] Table 9 lists per-asset elements for four asset types:[1]
- Algorithms (8): name, asset type, primitive, mode, crypto functions, classical security level, OID, list.
- Keys (7): name, asset type, id, state, size, creation date, activation date.
- Protocols (5): name, asset type, version, cipher suites, OID.
- Certificates (10): name, asset type, subject name, issuer name, not valid before, not valid after, signature algorithm reference, subject public key reference, certificate format, certificate extension.
CycloneDX, the OWASP BOM standard, added CBOM support in version 1.6 in April 2024.[2] It does so by treating each cryptographic asset as a component of type cryptographic-asset with a cryptoProperties object. Its assetType is one of algorithm, certificate, protocol or related-crypto-material (keys, tokens, secrets and similar).[3] Algorithm properties include primitive, parameterSetIdentifier, mode, classicalSecurityLevel and nistQuantumSecurityLevel, where 0 means no NIST post-quantum category is met.[3] See the CycloneDX CBOM format guide for the full field map.
Why PQC needs both
CERT-In's guidelines list RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman and DSA among the algorithms that Shor's algorithm breaks.[1] Finding them is a CBOM job. Fixing them usually means upgrading or reconfiguring a component, and that is where the SBOM comes in: it tells you which library and version each service runs, who supplies it, and whether it is still supported.
The link between the two is the distinction between a library that can do something and an application that does it. CERT-In's best practice on dependency mapping asks organisations to "clearly distinguish between libraries that implement cryptographic algorithms and applications that use them".[1] CycloneDX expresses this with two dependency types. dependsOn is the classic SBOM relation. provides records that a component implements an algorithm or protocol, and the specification is explicit that "a component that implements another component does not imply that the implementation is in use".[4] An SBOM alone can only ever give you the provides view. A CBOM built from code, configuration and network evidence gives you the usage.
Treating "OpenSSL is in our SBOM" as a cryptographic inventory. The library implements dozens of algorithms. What you must migrate is what each service has configured and negotiates, which only a CBOM records.
When one document carries both
In CycloneDX the two can live in one file. The CycloneDX CBOM guide says CBOM data "can be present in existing xBOMs or externalized into dedicated CBOMs", and shows an SBOM component pointing to a separate CBOM through an external reference of type bom.[4] Keeping them apart can be sensible: a CBOM reveals key sizes, certificate chains and weak configurations, and CERT-In wants that data encrypted, access-controlled and integrity-protected wherever it is kept or sent.[1]
SPDX is the other format CERT-In names for BOMs generally.[1] The current stable SPDX 3.0.1 model has profiles for core, software, security, simple and expanded licensing, dataset, AI, build, lite and extension, and we found no class for cryptographic assets in it.[5] A 3.1 release candidate was published in January 2026 for review.[6] In practice, CycloneDX is the format with a native CBOM model today.
| SBOM | CBOM | |
|---|---|---|
| Question it answers | Which software components are in this product, and from whom? | Which cryptography is in use, with what parameters, and where? |
| Unit of record | A software component: name, version, supplier, licence, unique identifier | A cryptographic asset: an algorithm, key, protocol or certificate, with its properties |
| Typical sources | Build manifests, package managers, container images, binaries | Source code and binaries, configuration files, live network handshakes, certificate stores, HSM and key-store exports |
| Who produces it | The supplier or build pipeline; the consumer keeps a copy | The supplier for what it delivers; the operator for its deployed estate (CERT-In asks consumers to keep an internal CBOM aligned with supplier data[1]) |
| How it goes stale | When the software is rebuilt, patched or upgraded | All of those, plus configuration changes, certificate renewals and key rotations that touch no code |
| CERT-In v2.0 reference | Table 5: 21 data fields, plus automation support and practices[1] | Table 9: per-asset elements for algorithms (8), keys (7), protocols (5) and certificates (10)[1] |
| Formats | SPDX or CycloneDX[1] | CycloneDX 1.6 and later model cryptographic assets natively[3]; SPDX 3.0.1 has no equivalent class[5] |
Worked example: a payments API
Take a bank's card-payments API running behind a reverse proxy. The SBOM entry for its TLS library might read:
library · openssl · 3.0.13 · pkg:generic/openssl@3.0.13
That is accurate and useful for patching. It says nothing about the quantum exposure of the service. A CBOM for the same service records what the service actually uses (Figure 2).
| CBOM entry | assetType | Key properties recorded | PQC reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| TLS on the public API endpoint | protocol | type: tls · version: 1.2 · cipherSuites: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ECDHE key exchange is quantum-vulnerable; confidentiality of recorded traffic is the concern |
| Server certificate for the API host | certificate | subjectName, issuerName, notValidAfter, signatureAlgorithmRef → sha256WithRSAEncryption, subjectPublicKeyRef → the RSA key below | RSA signature; replace on a planned renewal |
| Server private key | related-crypto-material | type: private-key · size: 2048 · state: active · algorithmRef → RSA-2048 | Quantum-vulnerable; note where it is held (for example an HSM) |
| JWT signing for payment tokens, in application code | algorithm | primitive: signature · curve: P-256 (ES256) · nistQuantumSecurityLevel: 0 | Invisible in the SBOM; found only by looking at code or configuration |
| Bulk encryption | algorithm | primitive: ae · mode: gcm · classicalSecurityLevel: 256 | Symmetric; not the priority for Shor-type attacks |
The dependency graph then ties the two together: the payments service dependsOn the OpenSSL component, which provides the TLS 1.2 protocol and the algorithms listed in its cipher suite. The JWT signing algorithm hangs off the application itself, because it is implemented in the service's own code. Four of the five entries use quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography, and one of them, the JWT signing key, would never have been found from the SBOM.
Keeping both current
An SBOM is usually regenerated at each build or release. A CBOM can drift without any build at all: a certificate is renewed with a different key, an operator edits a cipher list, a key is rotated in the HSM. CERT-In asks that changes be reflected promptly and that CBOMs be reviewed at least quarterly.[1] Treat the SBOM as the map of what is installed and the CBOM as the map of what is in use, and update each from the events that change it.
How KavachQ helps
KavachQ works with both documents:
- It imports the CBOMs and SBOMs your other tools already produce, and merges CBOMs from several tools into one view.
- It produces the SBOM in CycloneDX or SPDX 2.3, and the CBOM in CycloneDX 1.7, signed with ML-DSA-65.
- For CERT-In-style submissions, the BOM pack carries all the BOMs in one signed pack. The SBOM is not signed on its own.